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GERMAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY.

"We shall not light up our temple from that unhallowed fire. It
will be illuminated with other lights. It will be perfumed with o'ther
incense than the infectious stuff which is imported by the smugglers
of adulterated metaphysics."-Burke.
as an appendix to the translation of Kohler's PhilA NNEXED
osophy of Law is an appreciation of the work bv Adolf Lasson,1 who complains that he himself once wrote a philosophy
of law which has sunk into oblivion, probably for the reason, as he
modestly suggests, that he knew so much of systematic philosophy
that he had no time to acquire any "special scientific learning either
1 A professor at the University of :Berlin, who published in 1882 a "System der
Rechtsphilosophie" w)lich is the work to which he refers as characterized by little knowledge of law. His ideas are a strange farrago of contradications. The law, he says, is
an ordering to govern men's conduct toward other men and its form, more or less accidental, has been given it by history. Here he fo!lo\VS Savigny. He next announces that
all law is positive law, supposing thereby that he throws aside natural law. Law can
exist only as the product of the authority of the state. Here he follows Austin and
Hobbes. Justice is an absolute principle which has its source in equality. Here he follows both Kant and Hegel who borrowed from Rousseau. Justice, hbwever, is an ideal
which the law ought to follow but which it can never realize. Here he is on the ground
of natural law, but his assumption that justice is any more definite than law is wholly
gratuitous and commonplace. Law next becomes a portion of ethics, which, of course,
it is not. He maintains that the problem of philosophy of law is to interpret existing
law as an expression of reason. Law lives and finds its source in human consciousness.
The principles of law are justice and liberty and it is an harmonious expression of the
relation between the inner life and needs of the community and the outer forms of
the regulation of that life. The rule in Shelley's Case touches the inner life very closely.
He defines the state as a human association, which it no doubt is, but suddenly he finds
that to this artificial human association "belong the people, the land, the sovereignty".
The human creation, therefore, is higher than its creator, and lie says that the origin
of the state is remote from the people's wi!L Here he is thinking of the divine right
of the worthy Hohenzollern llurgrave of Nuremberg, who bought the old Mark of
:Brandenburg from the Emperor and thus made "the sovereignty of the people a meaningless term". At last like all the rest he reaches Prussian absolutism. This nonsensical
compound is to Professor Kocourek an important systematic contribution to legal philosophy. Lassan, of course, is at one with the eminent jurist, von Tirpitz, in denying
that international law has any legal status, i. e., Prussian recognition.
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in the law or any other special department of knowledge." 2 This
complaint is a confession, child-like and amusing in its vanity, which
could be dismissed without comment, were it not something that
is wholly German, very German of very German, I hope I m~·
say without irreverence; for German legal philosophers are plainly
separable into two classes, the very large class to which Lasson
admits that he belongs, who know nothing of law, and the very
small class, who know something of law but are not philosophers.
It is not an accident that these wise men who "profess" law as their
special province call_ themselves mainly either Neo-Hegelians or
Neo-Kantians. Neither Kant nor Hegel was a faint skiagraph of a
jurist, yet both essayed a philosophy of law, 3 based upon a much
wider system of metaphysics. And it is generally true that the German philosophy of law is a mere side issue of a pretentious transcendental theory of the Prussian state.
In an earlier work4 Herr Professor Lasson with true Teutonic
truculent arrogance avows that teaching as to the meaning and purpose of the state which is a household word in Germany: "The national state, representing the highest expression of the culture of its
race can come into being only by means of the destruction of other
states and this destruction can be effected only by violence." This
is the orthodox Kultur creed of greed and aggression which has
brought on the great war. There will never be wanting in Germany
philosophers to give a governmental dogma an apparently philosophic
expression and this particular dogma is the crown of their legal
philosophy. One looks at Lasson's atrocious statement-atrocious
for this age-and is wholly unable to realize the morally filthy soul
that is capable of prattling in the next breath of right and morality,
•Appendix II, Kohler's Philosophy of Law, translated by Albrecht, p. 331. In the
introduction to this work are some observations by Professor Kocourek, which are re·
ferred to in the preceding note.
• Hegel and Kant each thought that right was the fundamental idea and hence their
philosophy of law is really a philosophy of right, which is a very different thing from a
philosophy of law and is a task which may be attempted by a metaphysician with impunity.
It has been said that Recht here ought to be translated law (see Kocourek's note 1,
Gareis, Science of Law, p. 1), but this is a total error. When these writers mean law,
they use the word Rechts. The use of Recht for law belongs to a much later time. A
mere cursory reading of Puchta or Kant or Hegel will show the utter confusion that
would result. Right is to them the reality, law is a mere development of right, so far
as it can be called law. The transcendental state theory is caused by their attempt to
make the actual government the highest expression of right.
•Das Kulturidea/ und der Krieg, p. 66. Treitschke in his Politics i, 65, 66, sets forth
the same creed with even more rawness. Treitschke, by the way, thinks President Jack·
son was "the conqueror of Texas" and asserts that "the reverence of the masses for
President Lincoln rose to such a pitch that he could perfectly well have attained to kingly
power among them had he so willed it" (Politics ii, 285). Compared with him the
muddle-headed von Holst is a master of history.

GERMAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

289

liberty~and equality. It comes as a sort of shock to find that this
same Lasson, echoing both Kant and Hegel, pretends to believe the
function of government to be "the development of law toward justice, which offers the ideals of freedom and equality as the goal of
such development".5 This freedom and equality is best realized according to German philosophers under the autocratic military Prussian state and they seem to believe that they prove that the citizen
enjoys freedom and equality by being denied both and that the state
realizes justice by enslaving and destroying its weaker neighbors.6
We naturally inquire of these worthy idealists how they are able to
differentiate such a state in spirit and design from Morgan's band
of pirates. They as a social organization under an autocratic ruler,
who made women "walk the plank", realized freedom and equality
in the same way with a military organization and they had a form
of Kultur which could achieve itself only by force and violence and
yet a world of unthinking realists rejoiced when they were all killed
or hanged. Is it not for much the same reason that the whole civilized world receives as tidings of joy the reports of great German
losses in dead and wounded, tempered with regret that the wounded
were merely wounded?
The Herr Professor Doctor Lasson reminds us of Frederick the
Great's cynical avowal that he committed his lawless acts of aggression first and then set some professor to work to justify them.
It may well be asked what is the advantage of examining such a philosophy of law if its outcome is a palpably indefensible result.
The most important reason is that upon a proper philosophy of law
resulting in a proper theory of the state depends the question
whether there is or can be an international law, the most important
legal question for our day and the future. Another reason is that
in these last years we have been hearing much of the surpassing
importance of German legal philosophy. Lately a number of trans• Berolzheimer in his Legal Philosophies, translated by Mrs. Jastrow, p. 285, sup·
presses all reference to the earlier book of Lassan. He shows a similar reticence as to
Nietzsche and Treitschke. ' This is only another instance of the hypocritical attempts at
deception so prominent a feature of 1\liinsterberg. The latter never had the hardihood
in this country to admit the Prussian theory of the state, but he was trying to lead
up to it, as will later be shown.
•By a curious inversion of language, this lawless, swash·buckling, buccaneering state
is in their absurd language an lntel/igenzstaat, a Kulturstaat. But this state is on no
higher moral plane than when Caesar noted (De Bello Galico, ,.i, 23) that the Germans
of one tribe thought stealing from another tribe highly meritorious rather than blame·
worthy. Velleius Paterculus (ii, 19) notes them as natumquc 111c11dacio genus, "a race born
for lying". "The monsters that barbarous Germany breeds" (Germania quos liorrida
parturit fetus, Horace, Odes iv, 5, 26) have not changed in moral attributes in two thou·
sand years.
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lations of German legal works has been put forth by the associated
law schools. In reading some pro-German introductions and prefaces to these books we are made to feel that we have been losing
"the precious life blood of master spirits". The hierophants of th;,
propaganda have been attempting to commit the law schools of our
country to a serious and exhaustive study of these works to the
exclusion of more useful things. The rub-a-dub of this phase of
the pro-German propaganda is but a part of the general pro-German
drum beating that has found. places for such persons as Miinsterberg, Francke and Dernburg.7 It will not do for us to act as the
indignant householder who, when he had thoroughly digested the
German sacking of Belgium and northern France, went to his china
closet apd meticulously smashed all his Dresden and Meissen. Even
though most of it be hideous, it is worth while to look into this
enormous output of the professorial Pandours8 and see whether this
"country of damned professors", as Lord Palmerston called it,9
has achieved anything of note in its attempt to construct a philosophy
of the science of law, which is easily the most uncertain of all the
sciences connected with that most uncertain of all things, human
nature expressing itself in social existence.
These Germans for a century have been abusing each other,
wrangling through innumerable Enzyklopadien, Grundlinien, Grundbegriffe, Grundrisse, Grundlagen, Grundziige, Grundlegungen,
Grundlehren, and other profundities of that sort and through
periodicals and articles in various kinds of Zeitschriften about what
law is and the true philosophy thereof and the place of law in the
Teutonic universe. As a matter of fact the quarrel is over mere
words, theories and definitions, but not over actualities. To understand their various schools and conclusions we must survey those
•I suppose we may acquit the persons, who have been misled, of any consciousness
that they were being used as tools of the propaganda, but I hardly know what to say of
Dean Hall of the Law School of the University of Chicago, who was not ashamed to
enter on a warm defence of German submarine methods against merchant vessels. He
doubtless has now seen the error of his ways.
s I hope no one will understand that for the greater number of professors in this
country I have any feeling, but one of warm admiration. Many of them have given
themselves wholly pro patria. Their course is an honor to humanity. The great majority of professors of law in this country have no use for the German legal philosophy.
• We now reflect that Lord Palmerston was the only English statesman of the long
reign of Victoria who understood the Pru~sian aims. He desired to fight in 1864 for
Denmark and the Duchies, but he was overruled by the Queen. Until the letters of Lord
Clarendon, Lord Granville and, best of all, Sir Robert Morier were published, it was not
known how often the Queen mounted what Lord Granville called "her German high
horse" to England's detriment. The lowest period of England's foreign policy was when
Gortchakoff said to the English ambassador: "I understand, then, that England will not
go to war on a point of honor.''
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general considerations which enter into legal philosophy in order to
estimate the German treatment of the material and to comprehend
their riotous discussion. That any branch of knowledge should
have -a philosophy, it must first become a science. Science is based
upon matters of fact. What law is must first be settled as a matter
of fact. From matters of fact a theory or philosophy generalizing
the facts of the science may possibly be constructed if they can be
ascertained with completeness after a survey from different points
of view. To this end, law first may be examined from the standpoint of the larger facts that condition, limit and restrict it. Second, it may be investigated in regard to its place· and sphere among
the other sciences concerned with human conduct. Third, it may
be considered from the standpoint of the portion of human conduct
to which it is confined. Fourth, it may be surveyed in its growth
as shown in history and by comparative jurisprudence. Lastly, its
rules must be analyzed from the standpoint of what they actually
are, what the philosophers in their metaphorical jargon call its "content". Then a glance at the so-called schools gives some further
light upon the subject. The common method of approaching the
subject is by a ponderous notebook apparatus quoting voluminously
from various authors and creating a hodge-podge of illy digested
matter in the German way. If one attempts to say anything upon
this subject he ought to have in mind Seneca's advice, "It is disgraceful for a mature man or one approaching maturity to get his
wisdom out of his notebook. 'Zeno said this' : 'Yes, but what do you
say?' 'Cleanthes said this', 'But what have you -to say?' How long
are you going to march under another's banner? Put out something of your own. I have a very poor opinion of those who are
never trying to create, but always to interpret, always lurking in
the shadow of some one else".10 Besides, one who has spent all his
days in busy practice could not follow the common-place book geniuses even if he had the time to copy bulky extracts.
I.
FUNDAMENTAL FACTS.

The fundamental fact disputed by no one is that law is concerned
with human conduct. The obvious limitation upon human acts instinctively recognized by all human beings, whatever their grade of
intelligence, is that the lives of themselves and their offspring• must
be preserved. As in the case of all animals, the preservation of the
""°Seneca, Moral Epistles: 33, 7.
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species is bound up with the preservation of individuals. Since
human offspring require years of nurture to become viable, the preservation of the species presupposes the extended support and bringing up of the young. This ultimate fact was recognized by the gre~;
Roman jurist Ulpian in his famous passage (so much misunderstood) as to a natural law which we enjoy in common with other
animals. He speaks in this connection "of the union of male and
female, procreation of children and bringing up of the young". 11
This statement has been denounced by Austin in his raw, Jacobinical,
Benthamic way12 as "a foolish conceit" and "an inept speculation",
but Austin simply does not understand. Ulpian means that the
most fundamental natural fact13 about the subject-matter of law, as
regulati_ng human actions, is to recognize that human beings are
animals, that the elemental facts which govern and preserve animal
life must govern them; that the race must be preserved in the same
general way that every animal species is preserved and that the
preservation of the race presupposes unions of men and women,
and the begetting and the rearing of children. It is not likely that
any race, however low, ever consciously violated this absolute requirement. We know, as a matter of reason, what is the fact, that
the most fundamental part of law will be concerned with the family,
marriage, the domestic relations including parent and child, as well
as with the protection of human life and human security and the
assuring to the family what happens to be necessary as properly,
with suitable provisions to secure the family property to the succession of the children. Whatever may be the variations among
different peoples, this is found to be a part of every system and
it may be called natural law.
The second fundamental fact is that it is impossible to consider
human beings except in association with other human beings. I do
not mean the family group alone, which is predicated upon an unalterable fact of nature, but it is impossible to consider law as applicable to even a single family group at any stage of human history. None of the legal theories which build upon the family as the
original unit is verifiable. Human beings even in the lowest phase
of savagery lived and always have continued to live in some sort
of social aggregate larger than the family. This is a settled fact in
biological and anthropological science ; "man can live only in society
Maris atque feminae co11junctio, liberorum procreatio, educatio.
Austin Jurisp. (5th Ed.), 209, 210, 552.
""The natural law (jus naturale) of Gaius's Institutes is a different thing from what
is meant by Ulpian in the passage above. In other places Ulpian himself uses natural law
in the ordinary sense of Roman jurisprudence, which is the product of reason.
11
12
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and has never lived except in society."14 There is nothing new in
this conception. Aristotle's fundamental fact for his science of
social man called his Politics is that man is a "political animal" by
which he means first of all an animal compelled to live in a social
state with other like animals. Every society as a part of law demanded by nature must have a certain kind of law looking to the
preservation of society.
The above are the general physical facts of biology and anthropology to which law must be adapted and accommodated. The next
fact is that human beings are rational animals, and they have behind
them a process of development by which the human mind became
rational. In the progress of human beings through a time "miendlich Zang'', they became capable of reflecting upon their sensations and of rationalizing them and of attaining self-consciousness,
by which is meant that a human being at some point after birth is
capable of making his own mind and the minds of other human
beings the subject of his investigation, observation and thought.
Just as the human embryo reproduces the physical development of
the race, so the human mind in the individual from its capacity in
the child to receive sensations without more, up to the stage of adult
self-consciousness and rationality, reproduces the mental history of
the race. Since the human mind has never existed except in the social state, the mind of man is a social mind trained only to life in a
social state and no other condition. This social mind will govern
man's life and institutions, and since law is the product of the social mind of human beings in a social state, the basic facts of
psychology, the science of the social mind, as well as of sociology, the
science of the social state, are bound to form and condition all
human conceptions of law. This is no less true of the derivative
social sciences, ethics, economics and politics. No man has ever
been so deluded as to deny this self-evident fact. There is nothing
new in this express recognition of the interdependence of law and
the other social sciences, for Cicero has happily said in the opening
of his legal argument for the poet Archias, which we construed
when we were stumbling our beginners' way in Latin, that "all the
sciences which concern human conduct have a kind of common bond
and are related by a sort of blood kinship to one another''.1u
"Duguit, The Law and the State, Harvard Law Rev., xx.'<i, 23. The most primitive
types today and the human race as far back as it has been traced to the earliest types,
Chellean, Mousterian, Aurignacian, Magdalenian, Cromagnon, Azilian and Solutrean are
all social types. No fact is better settled in anthropology.
"'Cicero pro Arch. 1. Etenim omnes arles quae ad lmmanitatem pertinent ltabent
quoddam conun1<ne vinculum et quasi cog11atio11e quaddam inter .se co11ti11entur.
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II.
:FAC'l'S O:F 'l'HE SOCIAL SCIENCES.

Since the social sciences are the result of the social human mi11d
psychology comes first, but it happens that psychology and sociology
are necessarily indissolubly bound together. It is necessary to go
no further into psychology than to say that the mind as a product
of an evolutionary process can not be divided into separate social
and non-social faculties. In late years it has been demonstrated
that no part of the rational power of the mind could have been
developed if there had not been constant association and intercourse
among !llen. But almost all the legal theorists lose sight of this fact.
They assume that there is some contrariety between the individual
mind and society, and hence the collectivists talk of the collective
mind and its will, while the individualists talk of individualism. But
both talk of the non-existent. The conception of a collective mind
is a metaphysical abstraction pronounced palpably false by psychology, which knows only individual minds, but individual minds developed by, trained in, adapted to, and impossible without, the social state.
This individual social mind is the result of certain large factors,
nowhere disputed, which result from the associated state. Especially is to be noted the influence of language, first spoken and later
spoken and written, but men reached comparatively high stages of
civilization before written language appeared.16 Without language
men would be to each other what the other animals are to man.
By means of language men share the minds of others. Without
language, the realization of personality is a psychological impossibility. The reasoning power which results from self-consciousness
can arise only among men using languages and language belongs to
the associated state. This long process of development brought
men to the point where the mind was capable of benefiting by its
own and by others' experiences. The mere dependence on external
things ceased. The products in the mind of the senses ceased to
be in any way of controlling importance. Ideas and trains of ideas
shut out the things of mere sense. Man separated his inner self of
thought from his self as a mere animal, obedient to the senses. But
this whole development is, of course, the interaction of individual
minds. The expansion of faculties came from knowledge gained of
man's social self through language. The individual mind was ena It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that the world's greatest epic took form
among men who bad no written language.

GERMAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

295

abled to work back on itself and it was impossible for it to act and
it was incapable of judging of acts solely with reference to the single
self. No normal human being has ever had a mind that would enable him to avoid the judgment of his fellow men or to avoid action
for his fellow men. Collective action for common ends is of the
essence of society and man as a member of his social group, the tribe,
later the collection of tribes, and the nation, taking thought for the
common good, learned to take counsel with himself for his own
good as bound up with the good of others. He gained the distinct
adaptability to willingness to work for the common good and this
willingness is a" permanent feature of his mind which he cannot lose.
At last he became the so-called man of good will free and able voluntarily to choose the good for himself and for others. This he came
to recognize as his true self, something better than his selfish self,
and as his ideal answering to Browning's phrase that it is not what
man does, but what man would do that exalts him.
It may seem that we are far afield, but we are not, for half of
legal philosophizing consists of a denial of the fundamental truths
of evolutionary psychology. Psychology teaches that pleasure and
pain are not mere conditions of simple sensation, but complex conceptions of the mind, while the state called happiness is not determined by pleasure or pain, but is the individual's realization of
his own adaptation to his most complete functioning as a member
of society. Thus long before we ever reach law we get rid once
for all of the Benthamic theory of balancing pleasure and pain to
find utility, for the proposition is psychologically impossible. Happiness is the most intricately involved conception of the human mind
and it gives the answer to the end of society as the utmost adaptation of man in his development to his realization of his most perfect
functioning as one of the social aggregate.17 This is the true social
welfare, not because it is the greatest good of the greatest number,
but because it results from a process of development that binds humanity, and because the human mind is so constituted that it can
in the long run seek no other end. To this we may properly apply
the much abused word efficiency and say that law is necessarily
"If the great mass of lawyers had been trained in what may be called the new
psychology, and had not always had in mind the old psychology which kept the field
Jong after evolution ought to have overthrown it, we should have heard Jess of the ego
and far more of the true constitution of man's mind. Bentham's balancing to find utility
of a man's pleasure in killing another against the pain caused by the act is a low, dis·
gusting performance, eminently worthy of Bentham, but to a man capable of introspeer
tion unthinkable. His elaborate expositions in his Principles of Morals and Legislation
in Chapter four, "Value of a Lot of Pleasure or Pain", chapter five, "Pleasures and
Pains, Their Kinds", and Chapter six, "Circumstances Influencing Sensibility'' are for
psychology the greatest nonsense ever penned.
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limited by the necessary constitution of the human mind, to the
tendency in all men to seek the most complete development in efficiency of individuals in the social state. But since man can say,
"Mine is the world of thought, the world of dream,
Mine all the past and all the future mine,"
this efficiency is never alone a mere physical adaptation or productiveness, but is a tendency to realize the most perfect adaptation
of mind, and body reacting upon mind, to the highest development
of each individual in the social state which is consistent with "the
same development of every other individual. It is Matthew Arnold's
idea of.a culture that is self-realized, not the German mechanical
Kult11,r which eliminates the individual's self-realization. Thus
after all, the end of society is the improvement of the individual,
but as a part of society. As individuals gain in moral stature, society progresses, as individuals decay, society decays. A legal theory
of individualism which sacrifices society is as impossible in the long
run from a psychological standpoint as a collectivism which interferes with the highest and best development of the individual. This
truth rids us of any collectivism which blunts or paralyzes men's
moral conception. This at once disposes of the German theory that
the state has no morality and can be amenable to no rules, that
the state can be immoral, thieving, rapacious and murderous without affecting the individual citizen. We get rid, too, of all socialistic
theories which sacrifice society and individuals to a particular class.
They are doomed from birth because they deny the essential mental
·nature of man.
But the actual fact that man never was and with his mind can
never have been a solitary being, disposes once for all of the theory
that society resulted from an agreement among individuals, the social contract or social compact theory, stated by Hobbes, followed
by Locke, called by Rousseau the Contrat Social, stolen by Kant
and Hegel for base uses, accepted by Austin, practically adopted by
Spencer, made the basis of the Rights of Man doctrine that individuals agreeing to enter society retained all natural rights not necessary to preserve society, and asserted in our Declaration of Independence in its opening statement of certain "inalienable rights".
It is useless to examine a theory that is opposed to actual fact and
is as completely disproven as the flatness of the earth's surface. The
answer is that it never really happened, and if it be assumed as a
fiction, it is harmful, because it gives an impossible basis for the
social aggregate. Yet while this is true, it is no less true that the
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actual form of government, what Germans generally call the state,
for which they predicate a transcendental basis, is a matter of agreement or convention, because in many cases the actual time and place
of the agreement can be proven as completely as the date of a contract. But this shows the difference between the social organization or the state, i. e., the society for which the government exists,
and the actual form of governmental machinery. This distinction
obviously proven by history and proven by the forming of the German Empire itself by a written agreement, is an absolute refutation
of the German theory of the state. They confuse the matter, and
often deceive themselves, by using the word nation or state, now
for society and now for the government as if the t\vo were identical
and the terms interchangeable, a result to which they are prone, on
account of the vagueness and lack of precision in the German language. It is immensely to the credit of English or French or Italian
that the verbal tumultuosities of Hegel or Kant could not have been
written in those languages.
Turning now to the other part of the psychological conception
of the social mind, we come to the science of sociology. The term
sociology is a hybrid made up of a Latin and a Greek word and
until late years the science was as hybrid as the mule "without pride
of ancestry or hope of posterity".18 One of its baldest impositions
was the attempt to show that society was an organism in the sense
that a living animal is an organism. No one ever disputed that
society was an organization of human beings, but there is nothing
more crass than Herbert Spencer's19 attempt to show from a biological standpoint society as a single living organism by means of a
long, involved, fallacious parallel between the growth, maturity and
decay of a living organism and what he called the social organism.
And when at last it appeared that his organic theory was irreconcilably opposed to his extreme individualistic state theory, his retraction was nothing short of pitiful in the man and the manner of
it was mentally dishonest in the philosopher. But gradually sociology has worked itself away from impossible theories and the
biological basis of the German state theory is gone. It is now based
on nothing more substantial than metaphysics. Fact tells us that
no two or more minds can function as one, any more than two or
'"It will not be denied at this day that Comte sterilized sociology by his neglect of
law and government. By his exclusion of these things from scientific treatment, he
rendered a true sociology on his lines an impossibility. His science is called above a
hybrid, but it produced certain results just as the "hinny", which is a cross between a
stallion and a jennet, is sometimes fertile. The mule is always infertile.
19 See Spencer's Sociology i, part 2, for the discussion.
A host of imitators followed
him. The most prominent is Schaffle in his Ba11 imd Leben des Socia/en Koerpers.
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more animals can function as one. 20 Metaphorically the state has
been called a partnership, which is a better analogy, but best of all
is Burke's superb phrase that any particular human society "is placed
in a just correspondence and symmetry with the order of the worV
and with the mode of existence decreed to a permanent body co.i1posed of transitory parts, wherein, by the disposition of a stupendous
wisdom the whole, at one time, is never old or middle-aged or young,
but in a condition of unchangeable constancy, moves on through the
varied tenor of perpetual decay, fall, renovation and progression."21
Governments may rise and fall, empires may flourish and decay
and the social aggregate itself may remain. The usual term applied
to the social aggregate considered as the state not as the government, i~ a moral person. This means that it is to be coµsidered as a
unity both in dealing with its own members and with other social
aggregates and is thus bound by and amenable to the rules of morality as well as to the rules of international law founded on justice and
morality.
But while society cannot be conceived as a single thinking person
except by a metaphysical fiction, modern sociology has demonstrated
that society is evolving in the individual not the qualities, in Spencer's narrow conception, which contribute alone to his own efficiency
in the struggle for existence with his fellow men. We have advanced beyond the sabre-toothed tiger. Man has been developing
by his social mind, rather the qualities which contribute to his own
efficiency in making himself more capable as one of a social aggregate which is thereby rendered more capable, more articulate,
more humane and more just.22 This discovery now universally accepted demonstrates that there can be no enduring kind of law which
is based on the theory that man is solely an egoistic, self-seeking individual and not a social individual, or that he is on the other hand
to be disregarded for the social organization. But owing to the
fact that most men see only one thing at a time, there are bound to
be conflicting ideas of the function of law as governing men's conduct toward other men. The ideal is the adjustment of the individual to society and the social mind in its gradual improvement
is constantly striving therefor, and law in the end is bound to seem
to conform to "a double standard", but it is after all the single standard of the social mind. It is in the necessity for conforming to the
,., No one denies, of course, that the social aggregate is something more than a
mere civil corporation.
n' Burke's Works (8th ed.) iii, 275.
22 See Kidd's Individualism and After, Social Evolution and Two Principal Laws of
Sociology, which are remarkable works. They belong to a: world other than the ideas
of Comte.
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standard of the social mind that is written the certain destruction
of the German state theory that might is right. In the ancient world
the failure of society and the individual was complete. Every civilization perished, because there was no realization that the interests
of all human societies are necessarily the same. The destruction of
states by one another, the sacrifice of the growth of wealth and commerce to racial hostility or greed, was the failure to realize the interests of general human society. It is more than an accident that
the pa% Romana had its advent with the dissemination of the Christian belief in the oneness of humanity's interests. In this view
Christianity is a part of the great social evolution and undoubtedly
the greatest single factor. There never can be another Rome, since
that stage of social evolution has long been passed. Just as in
earlier society nothing was safe in the face of one strong marauder
and his confederates, until the force of the whole society suppressed
him by law, so in the society of nations the one strong marauder is
bound to be suppressed by the realization of solidarity among civilized nations and by international law. The historical development
makes it plain, therefore, that the ultimate basis of law in a single
society is the basis of international law among many nations.
This general form of sociological development must be given a
more particular application to. law. The efficiency of separate individuals in the social aggregate when added together must make up
the efficiency of society.23 Now the individual efficiency always has
been and always will be measured, roughly speaking, by his contribution to the means of living, considering life both a physical and
a mental state. This is a necessary postulate of the social mind and
of the law of social development. The savage's efficiency is meas- .
ured by the game he makes his own, by the goodness of his weapons
and by the skillful use he makes of them. In all civilized life the
same necessity for the accumulation of property follows man. In
highly_ civilized societies the works of the intellect are under the
same general rule. That there may be a contribution to the general
stock of physical well being and mentality, requires the incentive of
social estimation resulting from the individual's stock. This is the
reason why as man has progressed more and more of different
things have become the subject of property, 24 even to the products
of the mind in patent& for processes, in copyrights and trade designa23 The proposition that the whole is greater than its parts cannot be true if the in·
dividual's efficiency comprises all his powers as one in society, although it is doubtless
true that the efficiency of society is greater than that of the individuals considered as
separate non-social units, which was the idea of Aristotle in his famous phrase.
" The tendency of savages to thievery is due partly to the fact that they steal things
which are unknown among them and hence not the subject of property.
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tions. Hence property as a sociological fact begins with man ; there
never was a time when private property was unknown. By the laws
of man's development we know that communistic systems are
doomed. That stage once passed can never be regained except r ·
recurring to a lower stage of life which requires a psychologi1..<1I
alteration in men, for no law can be possible that is opposed to the
fundamental constitution of the average human mind.
The sociological law stated in another way is that the ideal of
social evolution is the perfect division of labor, physical and mental,
considering as labor every possible human activity that contributes
to efficiency. The materials of sociology are matters of fact, necessarily of historical fact. Beginning with the savage, history shows
that so~iety's expansion has been a widening of the number of those
to whom social duties are owed. This is a necessary result of increasing division of labor, and we find the fundamental conception
of economics agrees, as it must, with the deeper fundamental conception of sociology. In all ancient civilizations human institutions
rested solely on force, outlanders were natural enemies, 25 conquered
enemies became slaves. The state as the government was absolute
against the individual and had "neither moral nor legal limits i:o
its power'', and thus the government was absolutely identified with
the society over which it ruled. 26 Slavery was necessarily its economical basis, and even philosophers like Aristotle thought it natural.
It was natural only because of man's inadequacy to social conditions.
In such a society there could be no proper division of labor, but
it realized its efficiency in a conquering war-like organization which
supplied the best army and the most servile labor. Everywhere that
men developed the works of peace, wealth and commerce, came the
conquering power of some mighty military organization. Readily
recur to mind the Egyptian war-chariots, the Assyrian bowmen, the
Persian cavalry, the Macedonian phalanx and the Roman legion.
The policy of the ancient state with its dominant ideas was bound
to result in one universal dominion, which alone would survive and
25 Among savages the tendency to steal from outsiders is marked.
The German state
theory is an attempt to project this state of mind among civilized nations.
"°This it will appear is the theory of Kant and Hegel and Germans have never
gotten beyond the standpoint of the ancient world. In all that tiresome work, Hegel's
Philosophy of History, he "shows no inkling of understanding that the world even in his
day had passed beyond that point. It has been said with good reason that the Prussian,
at least, has never become a part of modern civilization. Goethe believed he never could
become so. Plato's Republic with his ruling class, warrior class, and his third class to
labor in the arts and handicrafts, in the fields and in commerce, is not different from
a society where all human industry is only of importance as it props the military power.
To quote Lasson's x .. 1111rideal again: "Tlie canuon is tlie most important part of tlie
weaving loom."
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which· represented the acme of then unrestrained national competition. But the Empire brought peace and with it the spread of
Christianity and its conception of a social force transcending a
group of tribes, a people, a race, a nation. In peace division of
labor substituted an industrial organization throughout the Empire.
This organization yielded for a time to barbarian inroads, but the
gradual social expansion disintegrated the feudal military society
resting on slavery and undermined the power of the barbarian ruling
class. The result was a constantly increasing division of labor which
promoted toleration against bigotry, and brought about the same
increase in the efficiency of the individual and society, the growth
again of wealth and commerce. Had it not been for the German conception of the state, its wille zur macht, the social expansion long
ago would have realized an international law accepted by all societies, and the Federation of the World would have been realized.
But the menace of a great military system required the arming of
neighboring states for self-defense. Only corrupt or imbecile Russian
doctrinaires could expect a durable state of security before the
menace was destroyed. We in America never noticed it in our
colonial existence far from the main current of the world's affairs.
And just as a national law is demanded in a particular society, so
an international law is demanded among all societies. It remains
to be seen, and the issue is not doubtful, whether the power of industrial society will overcome the organization of a military society.
The tendency. to wide conquest of civilized states can no longer be
characteristic of the highest social organization. It is now a moral
outrage and a social anachronism. The public opinion of the world
is too powerful. Marxian socialism, the attempt of a class to rule
in a particular society, is just as surely gone as its counterpart among
nations. But the essence of the situation is that at last nations have
developed the necessary social force behind international law that
was required in each particular society to form a base for its national law.
But this general view of economics needs to be supplem'ented by
more particular statements. Concerted collective action for social
improvement is a necessary concept of the human mind. Law is
bound to serve in the effort to increase individual social efficiency,
and the division of labor. A discerning man can see that the whole
of the law of contract as developed both in the civil and the common
law is far more significant than Sir Henry Maine's generalization
that it is a passage of society away from a condition of status. It
is a necessity resulting from an increasing division of labor impossible without contract. Let any man who thinks that courts
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make law ponder this to find what actually makes law-the power
of social development in whose grasp courts and men stand as helpless and chidden as the Greeks felt that the gods stood before tht>
eyes of Fate.27 Obviously the mass of labor legislation is due ,)
the same cause. Many errors in legislation are bound to be made
in the attempt to assist the natural growth. Dominant popular
ideas on economics are generally stupid, and this is the real difficulty with popular legislation. Our long career of wild-cat banking, our absurd independent treasury, our rank greenback phase, our
deluded silver obsession, our present system of gross inflation under
the Federal Reserve Law28 all show these mistaken efforts.
The legislation forced by popular economics in the way of appropriating one man's earnings to another man must always stop at
the point of a great impairment of individual efficiency measured by
producing power expressed in terms of property. As soon as the
insistence upon the supposed social welfare proceeds beyond that
point, private property, inheritance, wills and succession will be
imperiled and by the law of social development resulting from the
basic constitution of the human mind, the deeper tendency of society
to preserve itself will overcome the menace or society will disintegrate. If society has reached the stage of a nation, the national
2T This thought is from Swinburne, I believe, but I have not attempted to verify the
quotation. The idea is that the Greeks believed that men stood chidden before the eyes
of the gods as they before the eyes of Fate.
2S The government printing presses and the serried ranks of the finance professors
have been continuously sounding the praises of the Federal Reserve Law. It was the
work of impractical professorial theorists while the legal draughtsman was below con·
tempt. A few men skilled in finance pointed out its dangers. The inflation and the con·
tinuous disuse of gold have done much for high prices, which are elevated by the decreasing purchasing power of gold. It is so easy to delude the public by blaming some·
thing else that it is useless to point out the errors on which the Reserve Law is based,
and its increasing injustice toward all classes of peOple. If the country had done what
it ought, (1) abolished national bank notes and had the government bear the greater part
of the loss on the bonds, (z) abolished the greenbacks by retiring them, (3) retired the
silver notes, the most notorious swindle in the world, (4) legalized the issuance of notes
under the clearing houses guarding the issues so as to force retirement, (5) prohibited
all paper money under ten dollars, ( 6) abolished the independent treasury, we should
have seen a different situation. The pretence that the Federal Reserve Banks are of any
benefit is constantly asserted by sciolists, but their functions could better have been per·
formed by the allied clearing houses, a natural, not a forced growth. Had the six things
above been done, the increase in prices, if any, would have been only the result of the
war, and due in no.pa;t to inflation by disusing gold. As it is, every man's producing
power has been continuously marked down because measured by a medium that has been
continuously decreasing in purchasing power, assisted by a wholly unnecessary inflation,
but it is of no use to say this, because Ephraim was no more joined to his idols than
our people to paper money. Now we hear of a great United States Bank, the objections
to which were the only excuse for the Federal ~erve System. But this new proposal
seems to be for a promoters' bank.
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life will overcome the obstacles.29 If that spirit is not sufficiently
developed, the nation and the society it represents will pass away,
as did the worthless government of Poland. Social development
in some other form will incorporate such a disintegrated society. To
prevent misconception it is here to be said that in war the effort being by the social aggregate to preserve itself, the appropriation of
private property may go to any extent, provided the business organization is kept functioning. Destroy that and chaos will result.
In Germany today the business organization is no more. All property existing and becoming is pooled. The form of business activity
is kept up by an endless chain of credit coming back to paper money
and bonds. Every one is fed from the government pool, and the
business organization is not functioning at all. Far beyond the
losses of war will be the result and Germany's actual difficulties will
only begin when peace requires the dissolution of the militaristic
pool. Even the Prussian cannot be converted into a complete "slave
of the lamp". This is the sole question in Russia. Has it sufficient
national feeling resulting in social coherence to overcome the gyrations of law attempting the destruction of individual efficiency?
The incapacity of the Slav for self-government, his credulous imbecility, no less apparent in the Russian than in the Prussian masses30
presages the worst. But the law in our country has survived numberless Bolsheviki. The Adamson law passed by Congress at the
command of the Bolshevist dictators sitting in the galleries disgusted the country beyond expression. Now and then a typical
specimen of Bolsheviki attains high judicial position, but under our
system he is like a rogue elephant surrounded by tame ones and
cannot do much harm. We have survived, so why may they not
ride out the storm in Russia?
Happily it is only after man has reached a comparatively high
stage of civilization that society consciously attempts economic legislation. Prior to that time all such law is the slow and gradual
ZJ A case in point is the railroads.
Legislation assaulted them. The Interstate Com•
merce Commission carried out the work of destruction by pandering to popular feeling.
The railroads were rendered helpless, for proper protection in the courts was denied
them in the woefully wrong cases which held the Sherman law applicable to railroads.
Now the government seizes the roads to prevent a calamity, and it will raise the rates,
and pool the roads. All this roundabout folly was caused by an initial error rendering
necessary other and greater errors. Thus fate laughs at the courts and legislation.
""The great racial basis of the Prussians is Slavic. When Quatrefages, the great
anthropologist, was brought to Berlin to ascertain the racial descent of the Prussians, he
demonstrated that in the mass they were Slavs with an admixture of Tartar repulsiveness,
and with no infusion of Germans except in the ruling class. Thereupon the Prussian
zeal over die Herbiinft suffered a perceptible diminution. Bluntschli in his Theory of
the State (English Translation), p. 11, speaks of the Prussians as having "the pliancy and
submissiveness of the Slav."
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growth of massed individual experiences hardening into imperious
customs, under many of which as positive law we live today. This
is why the economic legislation of custom never goes backward,
while conscious economic legislation is generally erroneous.
The derivative social science of economics has been noted. 'I ne
derivative sciences of morality and law are the product mainly of
the moral ideas of right and justice. It is useless to speculate on
the aeons required to develop the general concepts which we call the
moral ideas. They were an infinitely slow and gradual growth.
Men came instinctively to think and act in a certain way. The
moral ideas represented numberless individual inductions of the
social mind slowly developing. These inductions were individual
judgmep.ts upon numberless concrete states of fact and at length
a rule of conduct instinctively felt to be just was gradually evolved.
The mental processes by which this moral idea has been arrived
at were forgotten and became the "broken potsherds of the past".31
In the same way the allied instinctive conception of right was later
evolved and those ideas of justice and right became moral ideas
with which every normal social mind was furnished. The idea of
the rightful is no longer furnished by a process of reasoning any
more than is the idea of justice, as the Socratic dialogues show.
Yet these instinctive ideas became in the mind the directing factors
of deliberate reasoning for making moral judgments. These moral
ideas are, however complex, not simple notions. They may be
analyzed and all are now fairly agreed that the fundamental notion
at the basis of justice results as a necessity of men living in a social
state, and that is that all men in the most homogeneous state of
society are entitled to the same recognition, that is to an equal right
to an equal recognition. All the philosophers consider justice as
having, therefore, two categorical imperatives, freedom and equality.
Equality requires equal action upon different men, which must be
arrived at by general rules. The idea of justice instinctively asserts
in this reaching after equality that when a man has done something
to another which reduces that other below the level of equal recognition, the one so acting must submit to the other's getting back
to the same level with the aggressor. This is the normal human
feeling whether we call it the lex talionis or compensation in damages or punishment proportioned to the offence. Thus we arrive
at the fundamental notion of justice which is equality before the
at It is nothing less than genius that enabled Pascal to venture the generalization, most
extraordinary for bis time: "Qii'est-ce-que la nature! peutetre une premiere coutume,
comme la couti1me est 1111e scconde nature." He was probably anticipated by Montaigne
in bis essay on Custom.
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developed social custom. Roughly the notion is that what a man
has caused another to suffer, he should suffer himself. Thus in
the code of Khammurabi, which dates probably from 2200 B. C.,32
when Babylonia was at a high stage of civilization under a written
code, which survived the Persian, Greek and Parthian conquests and
still in part exists as law, we read that if a builder build a house
so that it fall and kill the owner, let the builder be put to death,
but if it kill the son of the owner, let the builder's son be put to
death. It required ages to disentangle the son by reasons based on
better conceptions of justice. The sentiment of equality in recompense was called in religion expiation, in morals it was retribution,
in law it was punishment or reparation. This general notion is as
strong today as it ever was, for it is a formative concept of the
social mind. When a mob goes forth to lynch a malefactor it is
acting in obedience to this primal sense of justice. Legal philosophers, however, rarely recognize this part of human nature. They
conceive that men are all docile pupils to be harangued, admonished
or rebuked as in the class-room, and the Germans are the sort of
docile people who endure such treatment. The criminologists are
always forgetting that they must leave room for the human feeling
that in an atrocious or peculiarly unjust case men instinctively desire to see one who has hurt another, himself hurt to approximately
the same degree.
The other phase of the sense of justice is that men to be equally
treated must be treated with impartiality. This requires as a basic
concept of justice general rules applied to all self-regarding men
imbued with the social idea. We say that if a court is biased or
prejudiced it is unjust; we mean that it is not impartial. If a
court is venal, or corrupt, or swayed by motives no less corrupt
so well known among.us through the judge who wears some powerful politician's collar of SS, or the judge who seeks to meet the
wish~s of the appointing power or the judicial creature who seeks
to please the populace, the sense of equal treatment, of impartiality,
of equality before the law is violated. The cynic might say that
things being what they are among us, there is not much chance for
a correct_administration of the law. We all have suffered from
"the backstairs" to judicial chambers and few lawyers have not
had juries offered for a price, but courts in their individual in32 There is a hook well worth reading, although the first few chapters are sufficient.
It is called The Origin and Development of the Moral Emotions by Westermarck, an
Anglicized Dane, who like most sociologists would find himself in congenial company
among the Bolsheviki, but there is a great mass of material in two large volumes. AU
the German material has been sifted. The German writer to be consulted is Wundt.

306

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

justices deal merely in individual judgments. Courts must all pretend to general and impartial rules and even if they serve the devil
must to the general eye wear the spotless ermine of an impartial tribunal.
The dominant notion is that every one can justly ask from u.nother what the other can justly ask from him. 33 The snuffy old
Kant at Konigsberg announced with a great flourish upon his
metaphysical contra-bombardon, the largest of the brass wind-instruments, that he had discovered the basic principle of all law
which was so to act that your rule of action could become a general law. The lawyers turned from him in disgust for he pretended
to have newly discovered the golden rule and was merely editing
the S.el1llon on the Mount and the tenth commandment. As a matter of fact he was announcing what the lawyers had laid down for
almost two thousand years as the fundamental notion for the idea
of justice.34 It reminds us of the famous witticism of Speaker
Reed who said that he could never forget the inspiring spectacle of
a certain politician's pride and joy at discovering the ten commandments. While all men who are rational are ready to acknowledge
that justice requires for law general rules applicable to all alike,
the legal difficulty has just been reached. This general rule must
be applied to single cases of concrete fact. But of necessity every
human act that has moral significance produces a moral judgment.
This moral judgment may be applied inwardly to an act contemplated.35 It is to this sphere that many German philosophers attempt to confine morality. But a contemplated act when done may
tum out not as contemplated and the whole moral judgment goes
astray. This is of little importance to the law since it regards onJy
human acts actually done which affect other persons. Such acts, if
03 It may be needless to point out that the tenth commandment:
"Thou shalt not
covet" is the widest application of this rule. Precisely the same is Menander's fragment:
"Choose equality and eschew covetousness". Menander never heard of the Jewish law,
hut a quotation from him, "Evil communications corrupt good manners," came through
St. Paul into our burial service.
"'The Institutes I, 1, I borrowing from Cicero through the jurisconsults, define
justice: Justitia est constans et perpetua 11olu11tas jus suum cuique tribuere, usually
translated "justice is the constant and perpetual willingness to render to each one his
due". It means, however, "to render to each one his right''. At the basis of the idea
of justice lies the conception that what is due to each man all men have the right to claim.
35 It ought to go without saying that justice which concerns alone conduct toward
other men developed long before any introspective ideas of one's own conduct. Looking
outwards precedes looking inwards as a psychological necessity. Right became a much
wider generalized thought than justice. It contained not only all the conceptions of
justice, but it carried all the notions involved in correct conduct where justice was not
concerned. Hence it is that men's moral ideas of right and justice do not agree, but
right as the more vivid concept prevails.
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they have moral significance, at once become the subject of a moral
judgment, but if they are of legal significance, they give rise also
to a legal judgment. The moral judgment is governed by the instinctive moral ideas, while the legal judgment, as we shall see, is
merely a deduction by a process of reasoning applying the general
rule of law to the concrete case. The moral judgment may or may
not correspond with the rule of law applicable by reasoning. But
since the human mind is a unity the intensity of the moral judgment
and the intensity of the legal judgment as to any act may vary
greatly. The more intense the moral judgment, the more certain
the legal judgment, is to yield in the case of an ordinary individual.
Perhaps he may not know the legal rule applicable. Perhaps he
may know it beforehand. At any rate the ordinary individual follows his moral "judgment and pronounces the differing legal rule
very unjust. If men were so constituted that they could work one
faculty at· a. time, we should not find this difficulty, but the human
mind is a unity and works all together. This defect of the human
mind is not noticeable as long as law is automatically working rnstonv, but as soon as law becomes rational, the defect is apparent.
Hence the necessity for _specially trained minds whose legal knowledge and power of legal judgment are so developed that they are
able to disregard conflicting moral judgments. Hence it is that
after law has passed the stage where it is generally known to the
great mass of the commuriity as rigid custom, it is necessary to have
a specially trained body of men called lawyers, who alone are capable of legal judgments, generally speaking. The idiots who ask
that every man be his own lawyer and that the courts be filled with
men who, in their phrase, know "less law and more justice" are
simply quarreling with the constitution of the human mind and
asking to have civiiization set back three thousand years.
This view of the matter is not exhausted without noticing the
further fact that there are certain general rules in regard to right and
justice that all rational men at a given stage in a particular society
will agree upon as just and right. Those general rules as to matters of importance in the conduct of men toward each other will
generally be embodied in the law. But every general rule made
from the moral standpoint is likely to be swept away as soon as a
concrete case is presented involving some particular circumstance
appealing to the moral ideas. This can best be illustrated by a case
put by a Grecian sage over twenty-four hundred years ago and
stated, I think, in Plutarch's Morals. An importer of grain on
the Island of Rhodes had in the harbor a vessel of grain just arrived from Egypt. Owing to a scarcity of grain on the island, the
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price had risen beyond all measure and the grain merchant can ask
what he pleases. But he knows what no one else knows that a haif
dozen ships will arrive in a day or two and then the supply will
exceed the demand and the price will fall to normal or below. T,
the importer bound to disclose his knowledge to purchasers? G11e
school of Grecian philosophers and Cicero, the greatest of Roman
lawyers-greatest because he is so much more than a lawyer that
he is one of the five first class men of letters the world has produced-answered the question "yes", but the Stoics answered "no,
the importer was under no obligation to disclose". The Roman law
followed Cicero and imposed the duty of disclosure on both vendor
and purchaser, hence in our law the assured applying for marine
insuran~e is bound to disclose the facts relevant to the risk, because
our insurance law comes from the civil law, and as applied to insurance of vessels, the rule of law seems reasonable. But in the
meantime, the common law had answered the question in another
way. The vendor is bound only by express or implied warranty,
the common law with its well known practical sense assumed that
the purchaser can call for no disclosure except in a relation of confidence. The vendor does enough if he tells the truth as to matters
material if inquired of. Now this is a general proposition of law
which has, when no concrete instance is involved, a variable moral
aspect. But suppose the bargainer for grain be a poor widow whose
necessities compel her to sacrifice her all for grain for herself and
children. At once we are on different ground. The ordinary man
is revolted and he says that the rich importer who grinds the faces
of the poor is a rascal who should be compelled to disgorge. The
abstract rule means nothing to him in the face of what seems a
gross breach of right. The law becomes a travesty on justice and
in the confused idea of the Apostle, the law has been unlawfully
used, and if the law is, as Cicero says in his eleventh Philippic, ~
just sanction from on high jttbens lzonesta et prohibens contraria.,
a phrase repeated by Justinian's compilers and by our revered
Blackstone, a definition which is every day being used by courts
in the rural districts, the law is not what it is claimed to be.
It is plain that in some cases the application of a general rule,
and the rule must be general resulting from an imperative coII'mand
of the general notion of justice, will violate the popular sense of
justice or right applied to a concrete case. Law, except as custom
among poorly developed peoples, can not stand the strain. Hence
will arise the problem of how in particular cases to get rid of the
general rule while drawing a veil of decency over the process
Aristotle met the problem by saying that epieikeia or reasonable·
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ness should vary the rule. But this leaves no rule at all. The Roman aeqttitas mitigated the rule of law just as the English equity
did, but by an inevitable process equity develops its general rules.
To some extent the sense of a particular equity gives an opportunity
to apply the moral judgment to a particular case. As long :is the
rules of law are custom this process answers to a limited exknt.
But as soon as we have legislation the hard and fast general rule
is in a statute which provides for no exceptions, but forbids them.
'!'he great discussion going on as to free judicial decision in the
interpretation of statutes is a present professorial agitation \"hich
would leave nothing of the general effect of a statute but all to the
judgment of the judge. But this is useless, the legislature would
soon put the courts trying free judicial decision beyond :ill possibility of interference.36 What the professors cooly propose ;O the
judges is the commission of impeachable offences.
A system of law which in its administration does not provide for
varying the general rule to suit specific cases having a moral aspect
will not endure in a civilized community. Popular courts like the
Athenian dicasts or the Roman centumviral courts or the AngloSaxon county courts attained the result because the violation of the
rule was veiled in a judgment of many people. In English law
the original assize, then the jury, reached the same result. First,
the jury of twelve as sole witnesses to the fact and then the jury
with their verdict binding as the fact upon the court relieved the
court of the odium of opposing popular judgment and enabled the
popular ideas to set aside in the particular case the general rule,
by the simple device of a general verdict which blended the rule
of law and the facts in a general finding for one party or the other.
In criminal cases this is buttressed by the further rule that the
verdict of acquittal of the jury cannot be set aside for any error
however great. In cases of a judgment wrong to the moral sense
of many people, the jury bears the odium of an unjust verdict.
This device reaches free judicial decision whenever a statute comes
in question, but this sort of setting aside of the general rule is just
what is not desired by the professors, who advocate free judicial
decision. 37 Plainly if the moral judgments of men were to govern
26 See the Science of Legal Method, Select Essays; the paper by Geza Kiss (Take
heed, ye tuneful Nine) is a Hunnish view. The most absurd of it all is a paper by
Wurzel who, according to Professor Kocourek, gives us to be "born anew into a realm
of clear thinking and perpetual disillusionment". The trouble with the professors is that
they wish to abolish human nature. Since the days of Plowden this question of free
judicial decision in the interpretation of statutes has been worn threadbare.
31 In the United States and England no legislative power would listen to judges varying statutes to suit special cases. Where there is a Reichstag or a Reichsrath and a
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there would be no general rule of law in any case presenting a strong
ethical aspect contrary to the rule. All men are entitled to equal
justice under general rules except those who in the opinion of
many people are not entitled to it The result is bound to be . ·
compromise, but surely it is best arrived at by smothering unc.ier
a thick fog of administration the refusal to accord the citizen the
benefit of the general rule of law. It is certainly better than to ask
a judge to violate his oath of office or to bring the courts into popular disrepute. After all the vast mass of cases are the very doubtful. The whole subject is relative. The general considerations of
justice, the needs for human security, the general public welfare,
the need of honesty, good faith and fair dealing, the general recognition Qf the rights of property, of the necessity for keeping contracts, the injunction to refrain from injuring others, will in the
end give substantially sound results as applied to the great mas!;
of human conduct legally affecting others.
The influence of psychology, sociology and the social mind has
been surveyed. The science of economics was found to be bound
up with sociology. The sciences of law and morality were found
to be closely connected. The science of politics comes next. In
this sphere racial characteristics and historical development will dictate the great mass of what is called public law. The form of government, the relations of citizens to the government are purely matters of conventional law modified by historical circumstances. Up
to a certain point the sentiment of justice as civilization develops
will tend more and more to the abolition of caste and of class distinctions and the sentiment of equality which is but a phase of
justice, will more and more assume a strong moral aspect. Female
suffrage is now as much a moral question as slavery formerly was.
The case of Minor v. H appersett,88 a much respected deliverance of
our revered Supreme Court, which held that female suffrage presented no moral aspect, now sounds like a doleful noise from the
Dark Ages. Generally speaking the more democratic governments
show the higher civilizations since they require a higher degree of
the social sense and of self-control in the citizens and realize more
thoroughly the sentiment of equality. Social distinctions in the realm
ef the conventions, of manners and non-legal rules of behavior
will not be affected by law, but legal distirictions resulting from discriminations by law will more and more tend to realize the ideal of
judiciary trained to respond to any governmental suggestion, the discussion may have
some relevancy. Here it is simply nonsense.
aa .2? Wall 16.2. But under Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, we may still disfranchise
Germans when they become polygamists and emigrate to this country.
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equality. Perhaps in this realm the claim for social justice, socalled, should be placed, but that is more properly a phase of economics and the demand of a class. Its essential effort, to try to
render inferiority or mediocrity equal to capacity and ability, can
never be approximated until mental capacity in the mass of men
reaches a greater uniformity. Law has rendered physical differences among men of little account, but mental differences it cannot
reach. In the meantime, outside the realm of law, the labor organizations will insist on the leveling process, but their work is necessarily confined to their own guilds, and is of no more importance
than the work of the mediaeval guilds. Leveling in a class will
never achieve any result, except to furnish places of command and
large emoluments to needy leaders. The law will be used, however, to appropriate as much as possible of the results of the efficiency of capacity to the reparation of the lack of results of the
inefficiency of inferiority. That pleasant process will stop when
the efficiency of the individual is too far confiscated or threatened.
But judging by the past, the mental powers of capacity will enable
it to keep well ahead of the law's effort to appropriate its earnings
by the most magnificent philanthropy that the world has ever seen.
Thus far we are able to say as the result of the social sciences
that law must consist of general rules, that "the machinery of administration of the law must provide some method of decently
veiling violations of the general rule in particular cases which will
necessarily come when law passes the stage of rigid customs. But
as a necessary part of the moral idea of justice and as a psychological
necessity of the human mind the general rule of law to be applied
to a particular case must be conceived as existing before the particular concrete case to which it is to be applied occurred. This is
a matter of mental science, and is not a matter of law. It is a question that must be settled before law is considered as a product of
the human mind.
Since the sense of justice is an original moral idea closely connected with the sense of right, it is certain that the rules of law
which have any moral significance must conform to the moral ideas.
Therefore it is plain that the great part of law whkh is dictated
by moral ideas may properly be called natural law. As a part of
natural law must come as a necessary result of a developing sense
of social solidarity an international law regulating the relations of
nations to each other. This law is bound to conceive each nation
as a social aggregate acting through its government, where the different social aggregates are bound by the rules of natural law based
upon the sense of justice, of equality and of rendering to each na-
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tion its right as an equal with all other nations. Hence, international law has been rightly conceived by Grotius and his school as
natural law developed by human reason. The accident that there
exists no common tribunal to enforce it has no bearing upon it,
claim to be called actual positive law.

III.
SPHERES OF HUMAN CONDUC'l'.

We come now to the field of legal judgments upon human conduct and the sphere of conduct that is subject to legal judgments.
We kn9w that the largest part of human life never touches law
in any manner. The great mass of men never have a lawsuit.
Compared to the totality of human life, the sphere of law is a
very small part of it. The spheres of life governed by rule may
be called the sphere of the conventional and the proper, the sphere
of the moral, and the sphere of the legal. A large part of the conduct of human beings is dictated by received ideas of the customary,
fitting and proper. This is by far the larger part of human life.
The rules-of law rarely, if ever, touch this sphere, unless such instances as indecent exposure or public drunkenness or blasphemous
conduct forbidden by law and such like things may be considered
as rules of the becoming enforced by law. But no civilized man
ever avoided indecent exposure because he feared the law, nor
would such a law be necessary except as to certain degraded foreigners of the lowest condition. The drunkard is not affected by penalties against drunkenness any more than the religious crank refrains
from public expression on account of a penalty. Human beings
have standards of conduct and follow them as implicitly and perhaps with more instinctive readiness than they would follow rules
whose infraction brings punishment. These standards vary with
the various walks of life and are enforced merely by public opinion.
Such things have no more moral significance than one's clothes.
Once, however, the law as custom ventured into this field, and still
among less civilized peoples governs matters of caste. In our own
country, where the standards of civilization are lower, caste shown
by color is a matter of legal importance. But among highly civilized
men the law has nothing to do with this field. In some frontier
communities such a breach of good manners as the refusal to drink
with another may lead to bloodshed, but it is a mistake to call such
people civilized, though curiously enough, at the last general election they appeared as strong pacifists. Juries in those benighted
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regions have condoned murders in deference to a crude public opinion.
It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that these rules do
not affect law. These ideas of the suitable, the proper and the conventional differ with different classes. The man who robustly feeds
himself with a knife and is contemptuous toward the use of napery
feels a natural disgust at the conduct of other social orders. Jealousies felt by one class toward another in the realm of legislation
have a potent effect. Many a legislator votes for a foolish bill because it will please some class of people. In the administration
of the law matters of class have often a great effect upon juries
and even upon judges who may happen to have in some things
liberality of thought and broadness of vision. Witnesses who testify
may have their credibility entirely ruined by appearing to have violated these rules, so that they indirectly have often a strong influence in the ascertainment of the facts to which the law is to be
applied. A litigant finds himself persona 11011 grata to a jury or a
judge on account of some defect in manners or mode of thought
which has nothing to do with the merits of his case. All men sooner
or later find that they must conform to ordinary public feeling on
matters not defined by or made the subject of law. These rules
are of very great effect upon racial enmities. One nation classes
another according to its manners. We all remember the noble and
high-born Baron von und zu Krautschloppen, how disgusting were
his table-manners, how raucous his methods of food absorption.
Such a man 'creates a great prejudice against his country wherever
he goes.
The next field of human conduct is that great mass of human
acts which are the subject of the individual's ideas of right or wrong,
but which are not the subject of legal rules. Here we reach the
domain of morality (already discussed) not a little com 1licated by
religious beliefs. The science of morals, so-called, wil. never be
an exact science because it concerns the instinctive judgments of the
moral consciousness. What some men think right others think
wrong, yet in the rough most men at any given time in a particular
society think the same things to be right or wrong. There are
certain fundamental simple virtues, such as goodness of heart,
generosity, cheerfulness, mercy, compassion, kindliness, charity,
self-restraint and self-control, which most men instinctively admire. These virtues have a moral aspect. They render life and
human intercourse kindly and genial, they give a man standing
and reputation among his fellows. Their greatest effect is upon the
individual who by such qualities is so highly civilized that he finds
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obedience to law not only a pleasure, but a matter of necessary
conduct. But none of these matters ordinarily is enforced by rules
of law though in the administration of the law a witness or a litigant
whose conduct shows some particular circumstance of underhanr
edness, cupidity, avarice, disregard of others, lack of kindly feeli..g,
brutality, or any of the thousand and one things which lawyers look
for on the opposite side, or fear and avoid on their own, which too
have no relevancy to the facts or the law, may absolutely determine
a case whether before jury or judge.39
But the orbits of law and morality cross each other. The difficulty
is not avoided by saying that every violation of law is immoral. Of
course, it is not true, for all the law of procedure has no moral
signific~nce except in its equality, and a man who commits contempt
of court has committed no moral offence, very often his act is exceedingly moral and courageous before a drunken judge. Even a
mass of criminal law defines no immoral acts. On the other hand,
many immoral acts are not illegal. Just how wrong certain conduct must be to be forbidden by law is problematical. The great
mass of right conduct is not defined by law. It is just at this point
that we return a nos moutons Allemands. Here the German legal
philosophers have attempted a veiled but systematic assault upon
the science of law by the dogma, wholly metaphysical, that morality
concerns merely a man's inward state of mind while law governs
his external conduct toward others. To this view morality never
touches legality, and therefore the state even if subject to legal
rules, whatever it may do, can never touch the sphere of morality.
One of the most dangerous, because one of the most artful -0£
the "smugglers" of adulterated German metaphysics, either selfdesignated or detailed by authority, was Hugo Miinsterberg for
whose activities Harvard in a burst of unusually dense colonialism
had given a place. He has been the I anus bifrons of this German
propaganda. He began by giving us the rechauffe fragments of his
former writings in German not too strong for American daily
food. But at last he came fonvard with his "The Eternal Values"
which is a German mystification of the eternal verities. No doubt,
oo Lord Haldane, whose mind had become confused by much German, in his address
before the American Bar Association, in 1913, at Montreal, (Rep. Am. Bar Assn. xxxviii,
393) called that part of daily conduct which was not dictated by law, that part which
was dictated by the rules of the fitting and proper, by the German word Sittlichkeit, but
all through his address he mingled the ideas of the decorous with the ideas of morality.
There is no such use in German of Sittlichkeit that is established. It is the ordinary
word for morality. Fichte used the word to denote conduct which is not based on
morality or law. He said moral conduct rests upon choice. This is a true German
distinction, namely, none at all, for moral judgments are just as much instinctive as
judgments of the fitting, proper or decorous.
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he thought the time, 1909, was propitious. The war was coming,
as the Germans alone knew, and we were to follow the German
triumphal car in the harness of the German-American Alliance. He
announced, of course, as many men do and some of them succeed
with it for a time, that he had something freshly minted from the
great treasury of his mind,4° the "new idealism". It is the old
metaphysical trash that began with Geist and ends with Kultur.
Like most Germans he is sadly confused as to morality in other
ways,41 but his main offence is his theory of the relation between
law and morality. He gradually works up to a division of human
life into that of the outer world or industry, that of the fellow
world or law, and that of the inner world or morality. This looks
innocent enough though of course it is nonsense since his parts are
not mutually exclusive. The outer world includes the fellow world
and industry is concerned with law on the side of economics at
least, and industry is one of the main concerns of the fellow world
through division of labor. But the real vice of his division is the
assertion that morality concerns solely the inner world. Since, as
we have shown, moral judgments are the basis of much law, his assumption is contrary to fact. Having laid out this carefully camouflaged trench, he borrows the conception that "law is for us the
order by which the realization of the common will in the mutual
treatment of the members of the community is intentionally secured
and guaranteed by coercive measures". Passing by this old Rousseau common will, erected by Hegel into a dogma asserting the one
living organism of the state, here reasserted by Miinsterberg, it is
plain that his definition wipes out international law. Next he pronounces the theory that law has nothing to do with morality, for
morality concerns the inner self while law concerns the fellow self.
The reason that a German makes this assertion is his desire to feed
the German theory of the state, that the government is not bound
by the dictates of morality and hence owes no responsibility for
wanton onslaughts and brutal tyrranies. Volumes have been written in Germany to show whether the government can be limited by
Perhaps some may think that Miinsterberg ought to have the benefit of the de
I cannot think so. I prefer to say with Senator Hoar, when he was
asked about Wendell Phillips' funeral: "I was not present but I approved of it."
41 See the Eternal Values, pp. 63, 337, 338.
In morality the Germans remind us of
the old epigram translated in Hamilton's Logic, or was it his Metaphysics?
40

t11orl11is rule.

"The Germans in Greek
Are sadly to seek,
Not five in five score,
But ninety·five more;
All save only Herman
And Herman's a German."
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its own laws, and the result has been that if it can be so limited, it
is a case of self-limitation to remain only during its own pleasure.
This theory, without openly avowing it, was what Miinsterberg had
in mind to put forth, and his work shows him to be no better th?·
Demburg whose career is so well known, as a smuggler of ",.1fectious stuff".
This German theory is all verbal fencing. 42 The question is as to
an act. No one but a German "inebriated with the exuberance of
his own verbosity" could deny that human acts have a moral significance and are the subject of moral judgments. The question is
why some acts which men recognize as wrong and immoral are not
forbidden by law, while other acts are so forbidden on the ground
that they are wrong and immoral. The answer is that the distinction is dictated by the public convenience and the amount of interference with the public welfare.
But on the other hand, law while going part of the way with
morality deserts it altogether for other spheres. The rule that a
deed to a man and his heirs gave a fee simple, while one to the
man alone gave a life estate, the fee tail created by De Donis, the
conditional fee before De Donis, never had any meaning for morality.
The rule that a simple contract without consideration is void, that
an executory gift is not enforcible, that an instrument under seal
imports a consideration, that a common recovery with a double
voucher suffered by the tenant in tail bars not only the fee tail,
but some other innocent person's remainder in fee or the reversion
in fee, that a fine by the heir in tail bars the estate tail, but not the
remainder in fee and creates a base fee which endures as long as
there is issue of the heir in tail, are all matters outside morality.
Numberless rules of law can be cited that have no more to do with
morality than have the matters in the Federal Judicial Code. The
conclusion is plain. Much law is dictated by the fact that as to
certain matters there must be some rule, but what rule may be
adopted is wholly a matter of historical accident. On the other hand,
when an act immoral in its nature becomes of sufficient importance
to the public or to other men as to have the attention of public opinion or of the legislative power, it is almost certain to be prohibited
by law and in just the same way certain acts regarded as morally
right will be enforced by law, but a man who can say that the human
"Bentham who can always be relied upon for something untenable has a distinction
as to justice. Interior justice he says is the conformity of our will to justice, exterior
justice is the conformity of our action to justice. He believed that the judges made law
and hence he could have said law may he divided into interior and exterior law. In·
terior law exists while the judge is thinking about it, exterior law is what he an·
nounces as his decision.
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mind when considering the evil consequences of a contemplated act
is thinking of morality and when thinking of the evil consequences
toward others of an act actually done is thinking of law, has acheived
a metaphysical beat that is a physchological impossibility. What he
has done is to attempt an untenable definition of the moral ideas not
reconcilable with fact. He asserts that the moral ideas of a certain
point become legal ideas and are no longer moral.
In another field we know that the conduct of men is defined by
law which has its source in prevalent ideas upon economics which
seem to have a moral aspect. The record of the courts on certain
matters is a painful subject. For a few years prior to the Jacksonian
assault on the Second Bank of the United States, we had a currency that could fairly pretend to decency. 43 The bank prevented
great issues of worthless paper from western banks by presenting
the paper for payment. At once arose the howl of "oppression by
the money power'', the favorite cheap political device of worthless
demagogues preying on popular ignorance. The western states had
begun their orgy of great paper banks. The Supreme Court of the
United States, eminently sane under the leadership of Marshall, in
Craig v. Missoitri44 held the state paper illegal and void, but by a
close decision of four judges to three dissenting political judges.
Then came on the case of Briscoe v. Bank, which was the same
point in effect, but the court was lacking two judges and divided
three to two, Marshall and Story and Baldwin holding the bank's
notes illegal, but no opinion was announced since four judges were
not concurring.45 The case was continued over two -terms.46 Then
Marshall and another judge passed away and Jackson packed the
court with his wretched partisans. 47 The court now steadily deteriorated into stump speech decisions until it went to pieces over
the Dred Scott case. The mistaken decision legalized "wild-cat"
banking. The government could put no money in the state banks for
it was all stolen owing to the fact that politicians would not patmnize
solvent eastern banks. This brought on the curse of Van Buren's
scheme of an independent treasury carried through under the pitiful
Tyler. At last came on the civil war. The government needed
money and the solvent northern bankers, like the patriots they
"See The Second Bank of the United States by Catteral, a valuable book never discovered by such writers as Conant.
.. 4 Pet. 410. Read in the original report the superlatively absurd argument of
Thomas H. Benton, our old demos-krateo friend.
••See dissenting opinion of Judge Story, I I Pet. 328.
'"Briscoe v. Bank, 8 Pet. n8; same case 9 Pet. 85; same case I I Pet. 257.
41 See Sumner's Life of Jackson, p. 360.
Of the seven Jackson had now appointed,
five, Taney, C. J., and McLean, Baldwin, Wayne and Barbour. One good judge, Baldwin,
out of five was a high average for Jackson.
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were,4 8 agreed to loan the government one hundred and fifty millions. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, with ineffable stupidity
insisted on the money being paid in specie into the independent treasury. There it was locked up in spite of the representations of tr. .
bankers that such conduct would take away the metallic basis ~or
the circulation and cause every solvent bank to suspend specie payments. 49 Chase persisted and by his financial crassness broke every
bank in the United States. Then he invented his criminal greenbacks, and in violation of all sound finance made them a legal
tender. They started on the downward grade while Chase kept
printing more currency to accelerate the process. Then he became Chief Justice and, still hoping to be President, held his legal
tenders. unconstitutional. 50 The court reinforced overruled the
decision, 51 Chase and the Democratic hard-shells wailing in dissent, and thus we had the double curse of greenbacks and independent treasury. All these varied evils which cost the people of the
United States untold wealth and our currency evils to the present
day would never have happened except for the "hayseed" finance
in one absurd opinion. It is needless to say anything about the
Sherman law since it appears to be repealed by "unanimous consent", after running the usual course of ponderous and irreconcilable error; or rather, it has been found to be the ill-conditioned
dog which sinks his teeth into the calf of the best friend of the
family.
But happily for the law the difficult questions for law in economics
do not appeal to the moral instincts. They are more or less conflicts
between classes and there are so many classes that no particular
class,. except in moments of extreme governmental supineness or
cowardice, will have very much of its own way. The political appeal to one particular class stirs resentment among other classes.
As we proceed through other fields of law we find that while almost
all the law of torts and practically all the penal law has a moral
sanction; when the field of public law and the influence of the science
of government is reached, we are no longer dealing with morality,52
except when equality presents that aspect. When we pass to the
""Nothing in our political history is more disgusting than the usual abuse of bank·
ers, yet when the country is in difficulties they always respond as they are now responding. They are the one class who can claim "hands that never failed their country".
••See McCall, Life of Stevens, pp. 154-157. It is rather a pity that Samuel W.
McCall has been lost to Congress .
.. See Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603.
11 See Legal Tender Cases, 12 Whll. 457.
112 Th~ whole remedial part of the law is properly a part of the public law.
Even
Baron Parke, old Surrebutter himself, could not get up any moral enthusiasm over the
science of special pleading or that tort feasor of wide machinations, the casual ejector.
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sphere of international law we are again in the field of rules, many
of which depend solely on the abstract idea of justice. Among
civilized men whose moral instincts have not been blunted by the
training of perverts, public international opinion is much the same
as the public opinion of a particular state. Considering the Russian as denied as to the great mass of his population a place among
civilized peoples, or at any rate any but a low place, the Swedes are
the only civilized race which seems impervious to international
moral ideas. What Professor Kohler called "the great Islamic
culture" does not, of-course, belong among civilized nations.
To conclude this view of the part of human conduct dominated
by law, we are able to say generally that the idea of justice dominates the greater part of the law, or at least the idea of what was
once supposed to be justice, and hence law is in this sense natural.
But the enthusiastic description of Cicero, that "law is the distinction
between things just and unjust, a distinction that has its source in
that eldest and first nature of all things to which the laws of men
are all directed, which represses evil men by penalties and defends
and protects the good", is as to existing law but the mystical expression of "the soul of the wide world dreaming on things to come".
Law we must all sadly acknowledge is full of "defects, redundancies
and errors", but those things come mainly from the fact that law
must be a system administered by the weak and infirm minds of
human beings, and almost all its defects arise from a praiseworthy
attempt to make it "fool-proof" against judges. On the one hand
is the individual's forgetting that justice demands as the rule of
equality a general rule applicable to all, and on the other hand,
the lawyers and the best judges perfectly persuaded that unless
general rules are preserved there is no law. Above it all is the basic
'10tion of justice demanding general rules.
There is no criterion by which the domain of human acts governed
by law can be separated from other human conduct. Morality is
no criterion, justice is no sufficient guide, hurtfulness of the act to
society and to others is too indefinite for use, the tendency to promote the public welfare is simply a rule of public policy which is
as changeable as the chameleon. All these matters have an influence, but they do not define the limits of law. Can we even say
that law is concerned solely with human conduct toward other
human beings? The laws against cruelty to animals, the law by
which a trust for animals may be enforced, the cases of theft where
no one's property rights can be ascertained to be affected, the laws
against attempts at suicide, are only seeming exceptions. We may
say that law is a collection of rules which govern men in their rela-
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tions with other men, that an illegal act must be one which concerns more persons than the doer of the act, or, to use the phrase of
Miinsterberg which is very happy when applied Teutonically, "the
fellow world". The farthest, however, we can go is to say t}y ~
the largest part of human conduct toward other men is not the subject of law, that not all of right or wrong, just or unjust conduct
toward others, is the subject of law, that of the part of human conduct which is enjoined by law some of it has a moral significance,
some an economical significance and some a purely governmental
significance, but all of law, even its omissions, has in some view
of it a supposed benefit or advantage to the social welfare and hence
a sociological significance.

IV.
THE !,AW HISTORICAI,I,Y CONSIDERED.

The general facts of legal development are an essential part of
civilization. The progress from the miserable cowering savage
through his invention of the bow and arrow, assuring him food;
through the finding of fire, stolen the Greeks said from Heaven;
through some sort of pottery, assuring the means of cooking food;
through the domestication of animals, assuring flocks and herds,
to the nomad state, while the objects of property kept widening
as men had use for different kinds of property, gave man a certainty of means of regular living. Next he found that he could
cultivate plants and thus come together with his "fellow world"
in larger communities. Houses and lands now became property,
and barter grew as an iricipient division of labor. The working of
the metals and improving weapons made men prepared to enslave
their fellow men by war. The tribe kept widening and chiefs and
sub-chiefs gaining in power. At last the discovery of the precious
metals gave scope for a widening commerce and a larger division
of labor. 53
Generalizations upon the form of developing social organization
have been attempted. It is said that the order is a progression from
the tribe founded on marriage and blood relationship to the terri.. There has been a great struggle over whether law as the product of man's will
can be considered a cause, or whether the mechanical theorists are correct in denying
causal significance to all human acts. Jhering's Purpose in Law conceives law as con·
scious purpose, therefore as a means by which men consciously strive for ends. The
thought is a mere commonplace. The ordinary belief of men has been so, and history
while it shows men in tbe grasp of destiny, yet tends to show that with advancing civil·
ization men gain greater power over nature. But men gain at the same time greater
social adjustment.
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torial organization founded on occupation of the land, to the
seigniorial organization founded upon the relatio~ between lord
and dependents, to the social organization based on intercourse and
contractual relations between individuals. Similarly the family organization is said to have progressed from the matriarchy, or relationship through the mother alone, through patriarchy as in the
Roman patria potestas, to the modern bilateral family. But in this
field almost any assertion may be supported by some sort of gauzy
proof and the matter is all speculative.
But the fixed fact is that out of the barbarous stage men emerged
with a mass of customs, far more binding and inexorable than our
laws, but certainly deserving the name of law because they were
rules of human conduct governing men in their relations with their
fellow men and universally observed. This body of customs was
homogenous in the sense that religious, tribal, trading, pastoral and
legal customs were all binding alike. Gradually as combinations
of villages and cities and tribes gained a social feeling, states developed. Along the Nile, eternally enriched and fertilized, a district
developed a powerful government. In the rich lands on the Euphrates
and the 'l'igris grew another social aggregate, or rather two, that
were to contest the world with the Egyptian. On the eastern shore
of the Mediterranean and on the islands grew a great commerce
and the accumulated wealth of Tyre, and Sidon and Crete. The
Grecian hive swarmed to the mainland of Asia. Those great tradern
filled the harbors of the Mediterranean and the Black Seas. In the
.neantime a sturdy collection of villages was beginning its career
on the banks of the Tiber.
In the world today we can find every stage of this growth. The
Australian still uses a club for his favorite weapon. The Indian
until lately used the spear and bow and arrow. The nomads still
roam in the uplands of Asia. The village community with its common lands is found all over the world. The single tribe without
a chief is not unknown. The powerful collection of tribes has been
studied as it exists in Africa and as it existed in North America.
From the Andaman Islander who catches fish with his hands to our
high civilization, the phenomena are basically the same. The method
of increasing social aggregates is also the same. Through it all men
are governed by customarily accepted rules which are laws for
human conduct. The system of law is none the less law among
those who have no judicial tribunals than among those who have
our elaborate forms for litigation. Law, the fact, the thing itself,
is wholly independent of any judicial tribunal, and if we make a
definition of law we must regard the judicial tribunal as a mere ac-
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cident. But what is the common feature of all these various systems?
Is it not that the body of customary conduct was accepted by individuals and that men found that the social well being could prevail
only if the rule for all men was enforced by _public opinion? LiV' ,
speaking of the earliest days of Rome, has a remarkable statemeut:
"The laws are a deaf and inexorable thing, safer and better for the
weak, than for the powerful ; they have no relaxation nor indulgence, if their bounds are exceeded; for it would be a perilous thing
in the midst of so many human errors to try to live by innocence
alone". 54 This statement when analyzed gives the same reason for
law that the sciences give; it is the zeal for equality, the desire to
make all things equal and the rules of conduct equally binding.
Even a_ German may be quoted for this. Schiller says :
The law is the friend of the weak.
It strives to make all equaP 5
But comparative law gives us further light. We go back to the
stage of no judicial tribunals and the sanction of law is self-help.
The sufferer himself exacted the penalty for a breach of his customary right. When this condition existed, the law itself measured the reparation for an injury upon the principle of equality, and
the only measure it could give to self-help was an exact equivalent,
an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, ox for ox, sheep for sheep.
This is the rule of equality and a very reasonable_ rule for the condition. Compensatory damages, reparation of the loss is still our
guiding principle. In the primitive days, the custom gave the judgment, the injured individual carried his own warrant or execution,
but like the sheriff today, he took the chance of finding no one at
home, or of no property to take. But public opinion was the only
posse comitatus.
Society found, however, this process of self-help, and consequent fighting and private war, too costly. Men were ready to pay
for their mistakes and the more peacefully inclined were ready to
take the recompense. Now by the same slow agency of custom
grew up the customary tariff. So much was due for a hand, so
much for an arm, so much for a life, so much for a daughter's
chastity, so much for a wife's unfaithfulness. But how can any
man say that this is not law, just as much as our law laid down by
judicial tribunals. In fact, we can prove it law today. If under
.. Livy ii, 3.
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"Das Gesetz ist der Freund der Schwachen
Es will alle nur eben machen.''
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our law the husband find the adulterer defiling his wife, he may
kill him. This is the pure law of self-help. The householder may
kill the burglar, the cowboy may kill the "rustler'' who is making
off with the cattle. In a hundred different ways we apply the law
of self-help and we do it without the aid of any judicial tribunal,
simply by the power of customary public opinion called law. We
too have our tariff for a foot, a leg, an arm, an eye or a life. What
is our law as to personal injuries in dangerous or hazardous occupations? It is merely an accident that it is a statute. Public opinion
made the law, perhaps very unwisely, for it is a recurrence to a
barbarous stage, and such atavism is always unsafe. And what is
the reason for the law? The same old reason of law striving to
make all things equal. What now becomes of the theory of law
that it contains the element of a coercion by the public authority?
What becomes of the theory of law that it is made by a judicial tribunal? Here is law that carries no public coercion, law that never
heard of a judicial tribunal. The comer's verdict, the ignoramus of
a grand jury, the discharge of a magistrate, the settlement of the
.damages, are all the mere accidental trimmings of a higher civilization. We can emphatically say then that public coercion and a
judicial tribunal are not historically a part of the notion of law.
In course of time certain acts. become public offences and these
were at first the more dangerous crimes. A judicial tribunal of some
sort was rendered necessary. In some tribes it was probably the
whole body of the tribe. As the chief gained in power, such matters were offences against him as the public authority. As society
grew in complexity, the laws and customs grew and were reiterated
by individual cases. The elder men or the priests, as among the
Celts, passed on the questions and awarded the compensation or
penalty. But in many cases proof was needed. The oath was a
defence and then the oath with oath helpers. Other methods of
proof, such as the ordeal of battle, were developed. Perhaps it is
safer to call the trial by battle a regulated private war. But it was
all customary and rigid and formal. Perhaps the next stage was
that laws and customs were written down or engraved on stone.
Just as Justinian's compilers headed by Tribonian went through
the legal writings and made up the Digest, so Khammurabi, ages
before, wrote down the customs and the tariffs, and they were
found in great part when the great library was unearthed/ 5 " along
with multitudes of court decisions. The same thing is true of the
Lex Salica, or the Breviary of Alaric 01: the first Visigothic code,
... The diorite stone belongs to a much later time.
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or the laws of the Anglo-Saxon kings. But man is an imitative animal. He hears of other and better laws. He calls upon Solon or
Lycurgus to improve his customs, or Rome sends her decemvirs to
consult the Greeks, and much of the result is incorporated in t 1 t
Twelve Tables. But the Greeks made a lamentable failure, for tney
never developed a competent tribunal.
Two races in this long history showed a great genius for law,
the Roman and the Norman, but the Roman long preceded the
Norman, and in many ways helped to make the Norman law in
England. Their legal history presents a curious parallel and no
less interesting divergencies. At Rome a body of customs grew up
among a certain aggregation of village communities. They developeq the private ownership of land and personal property. But
the situation was complicated by the presence of two classes, the
original Romans called patricians and the descendants of the subjugated, or plebeians. Gradually a law of contract was developed,
first religiously enforced as a matter of good faith.' The right to
seize the person of the debtor and enslave him was recognized.
Private vengeance for a death was exacted, and theft and robbery
were originally private wrongs ·often compounded for money, but
there was a gradually developing distinction between crime and
private wrong. Gradually, too, the mass of the people gained a
part in the government, and in the making of laws. They had a
palladium of liberty (unicum praesidium libertatis) which was that
no Roman citizen should be deprived of life, liberty or citizenship
without an appeal to the popular assembly ( comitia centuriata not
concilium plebis). At last a commission was sent to Athens to study
the laws of Solon and a code of part of the law was made in the form
of the Twelve Tables. Now the law was ready to develop a legal
profession. As soon as law reaches the stage where it cannot be
generally known, a legal profession is a necessity. The practice was
first in the hands of the priests, then in those of the laity. A stereotyped procedure and then the legis actiones no less formal governed
the substantive law.
The body of law that grew up called the jus civile, was the particular law for the full Roman citizens, but all sorts and conditions
of men crowded to Rome. They were not entitled to the jus civile
but they had their own controversies either among themselves or
with Romans, which must be governed by some law. They were of
different races, and what more appropriate than to apply to them
the principles of law accepted everywhere and considered to be
proper because comformable to natural justice. This jits naturale
or jus gentium was potentially applicable among all people at all
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times and corresponded with innate conceptions of right and justice.
It was in fact a rationalizing process applied to the law and showed
the growing power of substance over form. Another term for it
was the jus honorariztm or the officials' law, and it became highly
developed by the responses of the jurisconsults to particular cases.
It gra~ually overcame and substituted itself for the jus civile. From
this source was made up the final collection of Justinian.
If this commonly received account of the Roman law is true,
and in its main outline it cannot be denied, it 'vould follow that
the Roman jits gentiitm or natural law was a system of positive law,
and that the legislation of the praetors embodied in the Perpetual
Edict, improved upon by the jurisconsults, is the greatest standing
argument for the advocates of the natural law school.
The growth of English law began with a ruling class of Normans who governed a much larger class of Anglo-Saxons and perhaps older races of servile condition.56 The Normans found among
the English a crude system of composition for injury and crime and
a set of popular tribunals. At first there was a sort of personal law
for Normans and another for Saxons, but this did not long survive.
If we could know with preciseness the situation in the hundred
years from 1066 to n66, the crucial period, much doubt would be
removed. 57
The law at first was one of forms and writs. The writs were
developed on Roman models by the clerics among the Normans.
We know the law just as it is developing a learned profession. Sitting in the courts were generally priests as judges, and all they
knew was the highly Romanized canon law. The king's judges
presided over the county courts when they went to take the assizes.
They were compelled to apply a vast mass of customary law, but
they soon wiped out in their tribunals the old composition system of
the Anglo-Saxons and practically all of the Anglo-Saxon law.58 At
first all wrongs and crimes were private injuries, and the one who
sought justice brought an appeal where either wager of battle or
'" For the continuance of Roman Law see Roman Law in the Modern World, a most
interesting and valuable book. It is by Charles Sherman and published by the Boston
Book Co.
or I have never doubted that the basis of the English population was Briton and not
Anglo-Saxon. The persistence of the Anglo-Saxon myth is to me inexplicable•
.. It cannot be too strongly insisted that English law is Norman and not AngloSaxon. I remember that Dean Pound somewhere quoting from Freeman, the English
historian, the most noted of the Anglo·Saxon myth-makers, cites the examiner in law
who insisted that William the Conqueror introduced the feudal system at the gemote at
Salisbury in 1086, and strongly insinuates that it was an ass speaking. He should have
recalled the historic instance of the ass that spake, and this is the only one on record;
and when Balaam belabored him, it turned out that the ass v/as right and Balaam the
wise man was wrong.
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wager of law by oath and oath helpers was used. The Norman,
however, soon developed a better style of tribunal, and got rid of
the hap-hazard popular tribunals of the Anglo-Saxons. He had the
genius to keep the popular element, but under control. Twelve mer
were sworn to inform the court upon oath as to the fact. Thc...,e
sworn witnesses soon usurped all other forms of trial through
the judicial device of turning the assize into a jury. This is the
unique development of the English law which had its errors as well
as its benefits. But gradually the form of trial by jury witnesses
reduced the tribunals to certain civil remedies, either the giving
of a money judgment for damages for breach of a written contract
or for a wrong to person or property, or an adjudication of the
owners'tiip or possession of real or personal property. This left a
large gap of jurisdiction which the clerical chancellors under the
rules of equity absorbed. Developing commerce brought the simple
contract more and more into use. The common law courts could
not enforce such a contract because they saw that a private contract
could not be witnessed to by the sworn twelve who could swear
only as to matters of public knowledge. Hence those courts were
compelled in the case of unwritten contracts to retain the old wager
of law whereby any debtor with six rascals could swear an honest
man out of his goods, as Lord Chief Justice BEREFORD tells us in
the Year Book. The Chancellors quickly took jurisdiction over these
matters of simple contract and enforced them until the common law
courts restored their jurisdiction by the growing practice of the
jury hearing the evidence of witnesses and by the invention of the
action of assumpsit to which wager of law was not pleadable.
The chancery system of equity and the system of common law,
after violent quarrels, settled down to a situation of peace; and
equity in its tum hardened into a body of well defined rules and
a strict division was maintained until in the progress of time the
two systems became amalgamated except as to the jury trial, which
compels the distinction to remain.
It appears that in many ways the developments of Roman and
of English law were analogous. Both started with customs and built
upon them. Both had a system of rigid formulary law which gradually yielded to the rationalizing process. As the jus civile yielded
to the jus gentium so the common law gradually yielded to the system of equity. The process in either case lasted over four hundred years. Both systems at the stage where rationalizing began
developed a powerful_ legal profession. The English process was
the work of trained lawyers just as the Roman process was the work
of jurisconsults. But Rome with her great legal and political capacity
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developed merely a powerful form of administration while England
and her lawyers developed political liberty.
Other nations have not been so fortunate. France was ruled for
centuries by a system of personal law where the members of each
race had their particular kind of law. This gradually yielded to a
system of local customs over which the Roman law presided as the
custom of the written law or common law. Out of this mass of
laws through a powerful legal profession France developed by a
succession of codes culm~nating in the Code Napoleon, a general
national law, which merely established for the whole country one
set of theretofore prevailing customs.
Germany on the other hand never had a powerful legal profession,
and there was no class to relegate to a proper field the professors.
There the lawyer was always held in contempt. The different districts lived first under personal law then under local customs until
at last came the reception of the Roman law which was called the
:ommon law. It attempted with varying success to supplant the
various local customs until at last the law, after various partial at:empts, was codified in the Civil Code which is mainly Roman Law
:md the work of law professors, not practical men. It has been
!Xtravagantly praised but is already showing the usual defects of
!very code.
Generally speaking, therefore, two races developed enduring sys:ems of law by their own exertions. In other countries the final law
was more or less the result of imitation; in either case the law as it
:ook enduring shape was the work of lawyers working either on
:he basis of custom or on the Roman law. The net result viewed
Erom a historical standpoint is that the law as developed among
:ivilized nations is very little of it the work of legislation.
The poets have attempted to tell us of this history. Lowell's
.ines are precisely true of the law:
"On the rock primeval hidden in the past its bases be
Block by block the endeavoring ages built it up to what we see."
A remarkable instance of legal development under custom has
:aken place in the memory of men now living. After the placers,
:he products of erosion, had been worked in our California mining
:ountry, gold and silver and other metals were found in the Sierras
~xisting in veins called lodes. There was no law to govern the
niners in regard to lodes which were deposits of ore in place, not in
letrit1ts, unless they made one themselves. The rule was estabished after an old English mining custom, by which the miner never
~oing beyond his length of vein could follow the vein anywhere
m its descent. This seemed to the miners eminently just and ap-
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plicable to any sort of veins. At last this custom in 1866 was attempted to be put into a few sections of ·a statute. But although
it was well known then that there were many kinds of ore deposits
that were not regular, the presiding Rhadamanthus, a strange ol •
Santa Claus named Stewart, could think only 0£ regular narruw
fissure veins. The law would have been excellent had not nature
proved so erratic.
Then came a development of the mining law which has been
claimed to be peculiarly an instance of courts making law, but the
facts are otherwise. The custom was not as narrow as the statute.
The custom was independent of ·the form of veins; it said that
the discoverer took the length of vein he marked off on the surface
with copvenient surface ground also marked off, and that everything
in the ground belonged to the owner except a vein that had an
apex or outcrop in some other person's ground. Veins were now
discovered which were not fissures but contacts of different formations. One side of the contact was often soft rock and large ore
bodies had made off into the soft rock. Stewart's law was wholly
astray but the courts followed the custom refraining from making
any law of their own. Soon it turned out that some veins were in
fact zones of impregnation with bunches or bodies of ore anywhere
in the zone. The courts followed the custom and gave to the miner
the zone as a vein between the end lines. This actually governed the
case where the miner not knowing how wide the vein was had placed
his side line cutting the vein lengthwise, leaving part of the outcrop
on its strike outside the claim. The whole vein for the length
located went to the discoverer under the custom. In the meantime
it was found that the discoverer not knowing how the vein ran
placed his claim across the vein. Still following the custom the
courts gave the length of the vein covered and side lines became end
lines. Again the outcrop crossed an end line and a side line, still
the custom as to length of vein was followed. But now came the
cases where great bodies of ore lay in the ground without any outcrop. Here the other part of the custom was followed and the
ore went to the owner of the surface unless some one else could
prove the apex. In some cases hundreds of thousands of dollars
were spent in cutting down or up through solid country rock, working out immense chambers, as if full of ore, with a ·full connecting
line of raises and winzes and levels, and in supplementing this dishonest work by colossal perjury to show an apex. One shudders to
think how the facts were settled in important mining cases. I know
of a case where the Supreme Court could not see that it was lending its authority to a holding that the descent of a vein into the earth
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was its length along a level run lengthwise in the vein. But out of
it all emerged the triumphant custom that the discoverer obtained
his length of vein and everything under his surface ground not
shown to apex in some other miner's claim. At length came the case
of two parallel veins of which different lengths were covered by
the claim. Here the court like the chameleon "attempting to make
good" on a Scotch plaid, went to pieces. No one in the court seemed
to understand the case and the court asserted that it had decided
the exact opposite of that which it did decide. The court left us as
the heirs of an insoluble mystery/ 9 but no one could claim that the
court made any rule of law. The law of water appropriation and
irrigation in the arid part of our country is an even better instance of custom.
Historically, therefore, law is custom, and rigid and unvarying
custom applying without exception a general rule. The idea that in
oriental justice the will of the judge takes the place of law by rule,
or that law has progressed from uncertainty to certainty is a total
error. The law progresses by a rationalizing process which substitutes a lesser certainty for a greater. No less erroneous is the
idea that a rule of law is not logically essential to the administra- •
tion of justice.60 It has been shown above that by the constitution
of the human mind a general rule is essential to the concept of
justice. When a legislative power is developed it by statute imposes
certain rules of law. The ancient division of lex scripta and lex
non scripta holds good. There is no other source of law and Bracton
was strictly correct when he called his treatise on law De Legibus et
Consuetudinibus Angliae. There is another professorial and pedantic
use of the word sources meaning the places where is sought information as to what the law is or was. In this sense constitutions,
statutes, treaties, judicial decisions, legal writings may all be used
to ascertain the fact, but the proper use of the word source is in
a causal sense, what causes the law to exist, and to this question
there can be but one answer, custom shown by general consent
and legislation. These are the proximate causes and they are both
one, for no statute is a statute unless obeyed generally as a statute.
If remote causes are sought and in jure proxima sed non remota
causa spectatitr, the answer must be the general sense of justice and
general notions of public convenience or welfare. For international law the same statements hold good, except that there is no
69 Walrath v. Champion Mining Company, 171 U. S. 293.
"" See 13 Columbia Law Rev. 696. For the most preposterous statement in this article
as to the law, a story by Kipling is cited.
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legislation and in some cases custom and the rules resulting from
general justice become embodied in agreements between nations.
In this description of legal development most thinking men will
miss any reference to the influence of religion upon legal concer
tions. It is no doubt true that religion with its great emotim,al
appeal has done probably more than all other influences to mould
the human race to the reign of law. It is with good reason that
the priest and the clergyman are said to be in alliance with the
lawyer. From the priest the lawyer both in Rome and England and
in other systems received the torch of legal enlightenment, and
when the torch was handed to the lawyer the priest still kept the
sacred fire burning on his altar. The moral law embodied in the
ten co1!llllandments has done more for the law of humanity in
Christian lands than all the statutes.61 The ordinary man long
after he has ceased to feel an active interest in religion and is
parcus deoritm cultor et infreq1tens unconsciously acts from his long
inherited training in the commandments. For millions those solemn words still fall upon the ear as the Divine law. The lovely.
ideal of faith, joy, hope, goodness, charity, mildness and self-control of the Savior's life upon earth is yet the most powerful emotion
to lead men to the virtues that make the gracious, kindly and law
abiding soul. Neither atheist nor socialist can ever still "the Voice
that breathed o'er Eden the primal marriage blessing". Millions of
men are gladly offering their lives for Christ's ideal of the oneness
of suffering humanity and in obedience to the moral law. Nowhere
has the essential alliance of law and religion been better expressed
than in the words of Bracton, himself a priest and our first great
legal author: Jus dicit1tr ars boni et aequi cuj1ts merito quis nos
sacerdotes appellat; jttStitiam namque colimus et sacra jura ministramus. "Law is called the science of the right and just whose
priests some one has said we are; for justice is our religion and we
minister its holy rites."

a

v.

ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTING LAW.

It is not necessary here to enter upon the controversy of a proper
classification of the law. The subject has its difficulties but they
are mainly difficulties of convenience of treatment. The point for
our present purpo_se is to state the comparative rules of law as
they exist among civilized peoples. If law is in general among all
01 It is peculiarly appropriate that Neitzsche in his Also sprach Zarathrustra should
say to the Germans: " 'Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal.' These words were once
called holy; before them men bared the head and bent the knee. * • • Oh, my brothers
I beseech you to break the old tables." Kohler is a profound admirer of Nietzsche.
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civilized nations controlled by the same physical facts, the same
facts of mental constitution, the same general conceptions of justice
and morality, we may expect to find a general correspondence in the
rules of law and the various subjects to which it is applied, varied
by influences of race and comparative advancement. The differences in details are not of importance for our present purpose.
The necessary division of the science of existing law would seem
to be into that part of law which governs the relations of citizens
among themselves and that part which governs the relation of citizens to their government; the one part called private law, the other
called public law. The division called public international law has
a separate place. That there is such a law as the latter as a fact
is proven by its use and application in the courts. Private international law belongs under the head of private law.
The law that involves the person and the duties which each person may claim as owed to him or her as a member of the social organization, resulting as such law must result from fixed physical
and social facts will be found to be practically the same in every
civilized society. Personal security will be everywhere protected,
but in certain countries arrests and improper imprisonments are
considered as not being private wrongs. The general disabilities
due to infancy, coverture, lack of mental ability, are in general effect the same. Even personal privacy and the duty to respect it
will be recognized except where the curiosity of the prying vulgar
or the low level of the newspaper will introduce variations. Reputation and social acceptability and occupational, professional or business standing will be protected from unjust attack. The variations
among different countries are of little importance and often wholly
accidental due to particular conditions. The method of forming
artificial persons and their powers and duties, and the relations of
the artificial persons to their constituent members and the members'
relations to each other, partly belong to the law of personality and
partly to the law of obligations, but they have in all countries a
complete general identity.
The regulation of family relations, marriage and its incidents, the
duration of the marriage and the property relations of the spouses,
the dissolution of the marriage and the results of dissolution, the
laws regulating the relations of parent and child, and the artificial
substituted relations, like guardian and ward, the succession to the
family property in cases of intestacy, the devolution of property
by will, are all a part of every system of civilized law. The local
variations are due either to current religious conceptions or to social
development.
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The laws as to the possession and ownership of property, its
acquisition and transfer for both real and personal property, are
practically the same in general features. Even such property as
patents, trade marks, trade names, shows a development very mu,..· 1
the same. In English law the differences between real and personal
property, the peculiar law of estates in real property is but a local
variation due to certain facts of historical development. Equitable
ownership shows some peculiarities in different countries owing to
the same reason. The law of obligations varies somewhat with the
effectiveness of division of labor.
Private international law which is ordinarily called the conflict
of laws presents an insoluble problem to those who think that law
is made. by judicial decision. The substantially similar results reached
by courts in different countries are an encouraging phenomenon for
those who look for an ever growing and ever more universally respected international law. Practically the whole field of private international law is the development of purely rational principles proceeding from the dominant sense of justice among civilized men
in the Roman law co-ordinated with the thought that each nation
should be at liberty to form its own law within its own dominions.
The part of criminal law that belongs to private international law
causes a formal difficulty, but more formal than real, in the classification of criminal law as a part of the public law.
Penal law concerns that part of jurisprudence which defines criminal offences. Criminal offences are considered as breaches of the
public order, and therefore they define relations between the government and its citizens. But however penal law is placed in a
legal classification, it is apparent that in most civilized countries
crimes are substantially the same. The great number of crimes
existed long before legislation. The ordinary penal code is merely
a transcript of the customary list and definitions of public offences.
Legislation has added some crimes and abolished others, but the
decisive and controlling features remain the same in different countries. In point of punishment for crimes the general sense of
civilized communities shows a prevailing uniformity. Volumes,
however, have been written to justify the imposition of punishment.
It has been said that it is due to a feeling of revenge, but as has
been shown above, it is really due to the sense of justice, to the
basic idea of equality. The conception that punishment is due to
revenge has done much to obscure the true end of penal law. The
theories are that the punishment is imposed for revenge, and therefore it is improper, that it is imposed for public example and
therefore where no public example is to be served, no punishment
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should be imposed, and that it is imposed for the reformation of
the criminal, and hence in the case of an incorrigible, he either ought
not to be punished at all or should be perpetually imprisoned or
put to death. All these theories have no basis in either psychology
or sociology. Criminals are punished for public offences because
it is for the good of society that their punishment should not be left
to individuals as formerly it was. Offences against the whole
society, such as treason, are necessarily punished by the state. The
reason why men should be punished for crime is because the normal
human social mind is not like a maudlin penologist's or a nerveless theorist's. The individual has the sense of equality and to him
it is plain that every offence of one man against another lowers
that other and the balance can be restored only by a punishment
proportioned to the offence. But as men have rationalized the law
they have found that the same offence greatly varies in moral guilt.
When depraved wretches steal a little child and hold it for ransom
and kill it to avoid detection or because the ransom is not paid,
every normal human being wishes them hanged. On the other
hand when a man under strong provocation kills another, there is a
different suggestion. The law attempts to rectify these matters by
means of degrees of crime and latitude in punishment. Sometimes,
as in the case of the woman who killed her husband for grounds
the law could not accept as sufficient justification under a general
rule, she was not thought at all culpable, and her acquittal of any
crime is smothered under the verdict of a jury. But the criminologists deny moral responsibility for crime. They generally accept
the mechanical theory that human purpose, motive and intention,
cannot be the cause of anything since they are caused by invariable
factors, for which the man himself is not responsible. This is the
old dispute as to free will now given a mechanical instead of a
theological aspect. The answer to it is that every human being
feels that he can choose his course and act upon his choice, and
the feeling of remorse proves this consciousness. It seems useless
to speculate upon a mere theory which ail normal human minds
reject, unless they happen to be criminal. But it is also true that
the free will of the best mind would be one that would instinctively
choose the good instead of an evil course. But for the purposes
of punishment and of society, all people must be assumed to be
responsible for their conduct, unless under disability of some kind.
Punishment becomes then a purely relative thing. But there is
more nonsense talked about reforming criminals than about any
other subject in the law. Probably the effect of punishment for
public example is grossly exaggerated, and if it is of any importance
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then the death penalty for most important offences is the proper
solution. But the point here is that crime and punishment have
little to do with any part of the law except the basic notion of
justice.
When we turn to other fields of public law we find a greater
diversity. Every civilized government has assumed the double
duty of doing justice between its citizens and between itself and its
citizens. For this purpose there has been established an elaborate
system of courts and of remedies for the exercise of what is called
the judicial power. As between citizens it is recognized everywhere
that the judicial power must be absolutely independent of control
or there can be no general rule applied or impartiality maintained,
which a,re both necessary to justice. These remedial forms are of
a general similarity. A notice to the opposite party of a claim made
against him, an opportunity to be heard, proceedings in his presence or in the presence of his counsel and an impartial judgment are
deemed necessary. The greatest diversity exists as to the method
of ascertaining contested facts, and it is in regard to these matters
that the imperfect human element is most in evidence. Next comes
the ascertainment of the rule of law applicable, which may be a
rule of law of the particular country or sometimes that of some
other country. Here the imperfect human element is just as much
in evidence. The judgment and its execution are analogous under
most systems. The peculiar English and Anglo-American institution of the jury adopted in many countries and the rules of evidence
nowhere adopted need not detain us.
For correcting errors of courts appellate courts exist, but in Germany their function is merely ornamental since the lower court
is not bound by the decisions of the appellate court.
But in deciding controversies between the state and its citizens
the question is at once raised whether the state is bound by its
own laws. 62 Under the German conception where the government
"'There is a growing jurisdiction in England which may well be copied among us
which shows the binding force of law. It would be a simian act more intelligent than
some of our efforts. M. Tarde would say that practically all general improvement in
law comes from imitation. The jurisdiction and procedure to be copied is that of
declaratory judgments where men can go to court and find before the difficulty happens
what their rights are. This shows that courts cannot and do not make law, for the as·
sumption is that a rule of law exists which will apply to the controversy when it arises.
And this obviates a great difficulty in the law. Law does not prevent anything except
in the rare cases where preventive action can be obtained. It leaves men free to violate
the law simply telling them they must either make restitution or in certain cases that
they will be punished. Generally speaking any one can violate the law, if he is willing
to pay for it. Even if he is enjoined before hand by the law, he can still violate it if
he is willing to pay the penalty. This no doubt comes in part from the idea that a
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is identified with the social aggregate, the state is bound only as
long as it is willing to remain_ bound. Theoretically this is true in
England with its doctrine of parliamentary omnipotence, although
Coke denied it. It is not true in the United States where the discrimination between the social aggregate and the government is
recognized.
The case involving the Adamson law 63 illustrates such a situation. It was the law passed by Congress at the terrified request of
the President. The law was upheld by a bare majority of the court.
The reasoning in the opinion, if such mental processes can fairly be
called reasoning, was to this effect. Congress has no constitutional power to fix the wages to be paid by interstate railroads to
employees. This Adamson law fixes such wages ; it is therefore
prim a f acie unconstitutional. But Congress constitutionally could
fix such wages temporarily provided it was necessary to obtain the
parties an opportunity to come to an agreement on wages, and to
keep the railroads operating in the meantime. Congress at the time
the law was being passed could have passed a law giving the parties
an opportunity to agree, by forbidding the strike and compelling a
compulsory arbitration. This means that Congress had power to
make arbitration compulsory. Hence the part of the proposition
above which speaks of opportunity to agree is wholly irrelevant.
Therefore the Adamson law was not necessary either to allow the
parties to agree or to prevent a s!rike, and no occasion was presented
for passing this law. The moment the Chief Justice conceded that
Congress had the clear power to forbid the strike and enforce a
compulsory agreement, the case was no longer arguable. The
assertion of a crisis, or public sacrifice by a strike was entirely
baseless. The only crisis was that Congress was at the moment
given a choice to pass a constitutional law or to pass one that was
unconstitutional. Even the decision of the court annulling the law
could occasion no crisis, for Congress could forbid a strike and
enforce an arbitration. This was the only point. It was not noticed
in either opinion nor was it argued by counsel. The majority opinion
refutes itself. If the opinion correctly states a rule of law the rule
is that Congress can create a crisis justifying an unconstitutional
law by refusing to pass a constitutional one. Such a situation is
no sort of vis major and the opinion is even worse than that of the
German prize court in the Appam case holding at the direction of
man could either submit his case to a court or submit to outlawry. A developing social
sense is slowly supplanting this idea of option, with the conception that it is wrong to
violate the law to the injury of another.
03 \Vilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332.
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the government against all international law that it had jurisdiction
of an alleged prize lying in an American harbor, because, forsooth,
the Appam could not be brought within the jurisdiction of the court.
But such constitutional chickens generally come home to roor .
Congress should then and there have been forced to do what the
court stated was within its constitutional power and, therefore, was
its duty. If it had been forced we would not now be threatened
with the renewed danger of a strike in the midst of war but would
be meeting a demand for another arbitration. The court simply
created an endless chain of crises by paltering. The consequences
were deplorable. The railroads were by this mandate brought much
nearer practical bankruptcy, their revenues confiscated without their
being h_eard as to the justice of the edict, and at last the railroads,
kicked from pillar to post between the Inter-State Commerce Commission and the courts, had to be taken possession of by the government to prevent their universal collapse. If Congress had the
manhood even now to prohibit strikes on the great public highways and to enforce compulsory arbitration and the Lilliputians on
the Commerce board should gain a modicum of practical sense,
this great Gulliver of a country would cease to be a subject of
laughter in its helplessness. But Puck's remark still holds good,
and we are diverted by an investigation into the conduct of a
leguleius out of his depth. What was needed to meet the Adamson
law and what is always needed in democracies is the courage of
the Great Chief Justice when he frowned down the wretched crew
of Jefferson and his partisans. He was pre-eminently a man who
knew and knowing dared to maintain the meaning of the lines as
true today as two thousand years ago :

"Justum et tenacem propositi virmn
Non civium ardor prava jubentium
Mente quatit solida."
The "civiitm ardor prava jubentiitni" was that of a class claiming
to override the law. Nothing in the history of the court is more
inspiring than the famous opinion of Stanley Matthews, now frittered away, when in the face of a clamoring mob he held for the
court that even helpless and friendless Chinese laundrymen were
protected by the law of the land. Probably the high water mark
of all judicial action was that of the English court in the presence
of war holding the orders in council to be contrary to international
law. Justice hath her victories even in an age of "sophisters and
calculators", but we ought to be grateful that any court survived
Taney and Chase.
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The so-called sovereignty of a government is divisible into its
legislative, its executive or administering, and its judicial power.
These powers are fixed by our constitutions as separate and independent and independently to be exercised. Theoretically they are
separate in every government. They are not parts of the same
power as sometimes asserted, for they have absolutely nothing in
common. In late times in this country we have been imitating the
German police state and creating a fourth kind of anomalous and
bastard power called administrative. 64 We have judicial power
administered by administrative boards and legislative power wielded
by such boards. This development has introduced a great deal of
confusion, and gradually the bureaucracy is entrenching itself permanently. This remark, it may seem superfluous to say, does not
apply to the activities of the country in war and to the numerous
boards rendered necessary as purely administrative assistants.
One of the favorite subjects of professorial assault is the judicial
power in this country of deciding which of two conflicting laws is
supreme. The courts do not in fact decide the point since the supreme law declares itself to be supreme. The sole function of the
court is to ascertain the merely formal matter whether two laws
are in conflict. The objection to holding statutes unconstitutional
is incomprehensible to men with legal minds, for to deny it is to
deny that men are entitled to equality before the law, the basic
notion of justice. The simple question is whether the government
is bound by the law.
There are the judgments rendered by courts and the judgments
rendered by administrative bodies. This development has introduced confusion in regard to the well known division in the law.
In the ancient world thought had not analyzed the different functions
of government. Their rulers took the customary law and sometimes
enacted it or let it alone, as did Sir Henry Maine's Runjeet Singh,
I think it was, in the Punjab. The courts and the assemblies among
the Greeks both legislated and adjudged very often in regard to the
same matter, and Aristotle showed this to be a great error. In
Rome the praetors legislated and then applied the rules they had
formulated, but regular legislative bodies were also judicial bodies,
like the senate or the comitia. In European countries there has
never been any controlling division. Montesquieu pointed out with
clearness the executive, the legislative and the judicial functions of
government. Legislation establishes rules for the future. An ex
"'1fany pages of pro-German stuff in our legal magazines have been written on this
theory which has cursed us with a lot of boards which use the government printing of·
fice to puff themselves.
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post facto or retroactive law or a legislative judgment such as a bill
of attainder or a decree of divorce, is not legislation whatever else
it may be. The executive power cannot legislate nor can it adjudicate. The judicial power can only adjtJdicate. It can renc.l 1
a judgment upon a particular concrete state of facts. Every judicial
act resulting in a judgment consists of a pure deduction. The figure
of its reasoning is the stating of a rule applicable to certain facts,
a finding that the facts of the particular case are those certain facts
and the application of the rule is a logical necessity. The old syllogism, "All men are mortal, Socrates_ is a man, therefore he is
mortal", states the exact form of a judicial judgment. The existing
rule of law is: Every man who with malice aforethought kills another i~ the peace of the people is guilty of murder. The defendant with malice aforethought killed A.B. in the peace of the people,
therefore the defendant is guilty of murder.
The rule of law and its application may be reached in a thousand
different ways, but a judgment of a court is always this pure deduction. Now it must be perfectly apparent to any one who is willing
to admit the rules governing rational mental action that unless the
rule of the major premise exists as antecedent to the ascertainment of
the fact or facts put into the minor premise, there is no judicial act
in stating the judgment. The man who claims that under our system
the courts make law is asserting that the courts habitually act unconstitutionally. In other countries the question of division of power
is not important for in England parliament is omnipotent, in France
the division is not imperative, in · Germany the government is
omnipotent.
In the philosophy of the law another question has arisen which
presents no difficulty whatever, if the distinction between national
society, the state or the nation. and the government erected by law
is kept in mind. From our earliest history we have been accustomed
to the fact that the Federal government was the creation of an agreement made at a definite time and place while it was no less apparent
that the national society was something very different, indissoluble
in its character and the result of a natural growth. But in countries
like Germany where society and the state is identical with the government, a real difficulty is presented. Until 1870 the Prussian
theory of the absolute identity of the social organism and the government as metaphysically outlined by Hegel, was complete. But
when the German Empire was formed a federated government appeared. There was no question regarding the unity of Germany's
social organization. There was no question of the fact that the
unity of the German social aggregate was a natural growth while
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the German Empire as a ruling government was the creation of an
agreement which had been made at a definite time and place. The
German legal philosophers were at sea. As has been pointed out by
M. Duguit, Gerber denies unlimited power to the government, he
differentiates between the government and the social aggregate and
even to the social aggregate he denies unlimited power, thus agreeing with an enunciation of our Supreme Court in Loan Association
v. Topeka. Jellinek, while he differentiated society and the state by
which he means the government, and afterwards says the separation is possible only as :an abstract conception, still clung to the
Prussian state theory, and he held that the government was bound
by the laws only because it was self limited.65 In this Jellinek was
merely following Jhering who reached the same result by a sort
of transcendental reasoning. 66 The Bavarian Seydel went to the
other extreme, and in order to prove Bavaria a sovereignty denied
sovereignty to the empire or that it was even a state. Then he reasserted in the most violent form the Prussian theory of the state
and applied it to insignificant Bavaria, which was exactly like the
wretched State of South Carolina insisting that it was sovereign and
the nation its creature. But M. Duguit does not note that Preuss67
completely undermined the whole Hegelian theory by revising
the notion of sovereignty. Singularly enough in this country where
the distinction between the social aggregate, the nation and the government artificially constituted has always been recognized, this
deceptive theory of sovereignty has always been clung to. Preuss
rejects the notion of absolute sovereignty and shows that "there is
in reality no sovereign state, exercising an absolute and unlimited
authority. The authority of each state is in fact limited, and depends externally upon international relations and internally upon
the organization of the different groupings which compose it. It is
impossible to confute the arguments which Preuss brings forward". 68
Kohler takes refuge in vague generalities69 but in effect agrees with
Preuss. It is worthy of note that Fritz Berolzheimer in his World's
Legal Philosophies is so imbued with the Prussian professorial
mental hypocrisy, which consists in ignoring what does not suit its
purpose, that he declines to notice in his much touted exhaustive
work either Gerber, Seydel or Preuss although he gives much space
to the self limitation theory of the state as bound by law.
05 See Duguit, The Law and the State, Har. Law Rev. 119, 123•
.. See Duguit op. cit. 126, 148.
01 Gemeinde, Staat, Reich.
05 Korkunov, Theory of Law (Hastings' Translation), 340 •
.. Kohler, Philosophy of Law, 297.
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We come finally to international law. Private international law
will always be applied and enforced by the tribunals of a particular
state and we are not. further concerned with it here. Public international law governs the external relations of states between therr selves. If coercive power or a judicial tribunal or tribunals coextensive with the law are necessary to the conception of law then
there is no international law. But international law is not a theory,
it is a fact. It is recognized the world over and treated as existing
law by the courts of every civilized country. No theory can repeal
the fact. Even Jellinek admits that there is an international law,
that coercion and tribunals are not necessary to the conception of
law but he takes the secession ground that whenever international
law co~es in conflict with the supposed interests of a particular state
it must yield to that state. But this theory leaves no international
law. On the other hand we have our Supreme Court asserting in
the strongest possible way that no one nation can vary a rule of
international law.70 Gareis recognizes its existence71 and Kohler
asserts with positiveness that there is a supernational law of much
the same character as the law of federated states.72
We have now surveyed the field of existing law and found that
the sources, at least, of all private and public law, are custom and
legislation, and of public international law are custom, treaties and
conventions. The addition of treaties and conventions between nations is rendered necessary by the fact that in the field of international law these elements are often equivalent to legislation.

vr.
SCHOOLS OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY.

The school which is the oldest is in fact the only school of legal
philosophy that has ever accomplished results. Men who talk about
the so-called school of natural law rarely betray any knowledge of
what the term means. It advocates the application of rationalized
justice to the rules of positive law. As we have seen, the social
human mind as a necessity of its development looks through the
hum-drum, every day life of man and his imperfect functioning as
a social being to an ideal world where justice alone shall reign.
The ancients who saw life more clearly in certain ways than we
••The Nereide, 9 Cranch 388; The Scotia, 14 Wall. 170; and Miller v. Ship Resolu·
tion, :z Dall. 1, under Confederation.
n Gareis, Science of Law, 75, 289.
u Kohler, Philosophy of Law, 296, 300.
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see it, because they saw it divested of the vast mass of the machinery
of life which confuses our thoughts and blurs our vision, dreamed
of an age when Astraea would return to earth and all law would
become so perfect that all men would instinctively obey it. The
ideal was correct and is still the controlling ideal. Some of the
noblest expressions in literature show this craving of humanity. The
great dramatist,
"whose even-balanced soul
From first youth tested up to extreme old age
Business could not make dull or passion wild;
Who saw life steadily and saw it whole;"
has told us of "the laws that in the highest heaven had their birth,
neither did the race of mortal men beget them nor shall oblivion
ever put them to sleep, for the power of God is mighty in them
and groweth not old".74 This eternal craving is that to which Cicero
appealed as "the law which was never written and which we were
never taught, which we never learned by reading, but which was
drawn from nature herself, in which we have never been instructed
but for which we were made, which was never created by man's
institutions, but with which we are all imbued".711 This was the
future universal world law of Cicero quoted by Judge S'rORY in
Swift v. Tyson,16 when laying down a rule of general law: "There
will not be one law at Rome, another at Athens, one today and another tomorrow, but everywhere and among all races and at all
times, one and the same law shall obtain."77 This law dictated by
the highest reason of man the Romans called natural law, the law
of nations, and nobly the Roman jurisconsults labored on the superb
edifice which is still being repaired and adorned. These ideas converted the raw jus civile into a jus naturale, discovered by a just
consideration of the agreement or disagreement of human actions
with the social mind of man, the product of the greatest body of
lawyers this world has ever seen, not excepting the English and the
French. It is an attempt to accommodate law to ideal justice.
Our greatest publicist speaks with the amplitude and spirit of
Cicero:
"Justice is the greatest interest of man on earth. It is the ligament
which holds civilized nations together. Wherever her temple stands,
and as long as it is duly honored, there is a foundation for social
•• Sophocles, Oediqus Rex, 863.
"Cicero pro Milone, 10.
•• 16 Pet. 1, 19, quoted from Lord Mansfield in Luke v. Lyde,
n Cicero, De Rep. III, 22.

2

Burr. 883, 887.
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security, general happiness, and the improvement and progress of
our race. And whoever labors on this edifice with usefulness and
distinction, whoever clears its foundations, strengthens its pillars,
adorns its entablatures or contributes to raise its august dome still
higher in the skies, connects himself in name, and fame, and character, with that which is and must be as durable as the frame of
human society."
He, too, was a disciple of the school of natural law. This ideal
for which the great and good of this earth have striven is the teach.ing of the school of natural law, and in spite of the deadly legal
Philistine it is still the ideal toward which the great and the good
are striving. Its system of jurisprudence came to be regarded as a
univers?-1 law of all mankind, common to all European nations, because resting on the nature of things and the general sense of
equity obtaining among all men, a sort of natural law exacting
recognition everywhere by its inherent reasonableness. The theory
of this school was that an ideal system of law could be constructed
by means of reason working with the sense of justice and right, to
which all rules of positive law should be made to accord, and they,
so far as they did not accord with it, were unsound and indefensible.
In modern times Grotius and his followers upon this basis founded
a theory and practice of international law, and it is plain that international law can find no other basis. The horrors of the Thirty
Years War, perpetrated fortunately by Germans upon other Germans, led to the development of that international law recognized by
all civilized nations until the Kaiser arrogantly announced: "There
is no longer an international law". And we may hope that these
new German horrors will mark another great advance in international law by enforcing again on the broken savages the rule of international justice. All the really great names in the philosophy of
law were natural law advocates. Rousseau, and the Encyclopedists,
K:ant, Fichte and Hegel were disciples of this school. All the noted
international jurists are its devoted adherents. Schopenhauer, the
one clear thinker among the German metaphysicians, asserted a pure
ethical law which created a science of law independent of all statutes.
The school is just as powerful today; whenever a legal philosopher
appeals to the ideal of justice, whosoever admits that that ideal is
what the law must strive for, whoever believes that the law should
be consciously fashioned in aid· of justice among men, which is
merely the expression of the social mind devoted to its social ideal
of freedom and equality, is burning incense before the shrines of
this school. All the men who denounce the school of natural law
recognize its efficacy. Savigny and Puchta are just as surely bound
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to it as Kohler or Stammler. Volumes have been written by men to
denounce it, and yet in the midst of their denunciations they were
appealing to its ideals. It will always survive, for it is based upon
an unalterable fact, a constant aspiration of the normal human
social mind. The men who think it dead are only deluding themselves, and when they appeal to reason and justice, they assume
its livery.
But this school of law was too narrow. Men do not live by ideals
alone. Its ideal was sound enough for a part of law, but it ignored
certain facts in human society. A natural law unchangeable, eternal
and universal, resulting necessarily from man's nature, is impossible for the whole of law. It does not take into consideration the
changing life and improving nature of man, nor. that the social
mind of man is constantly adapting itself in a greater degree to the
social life of man. Certain fundamental parts of law and the matters that condition all legal rules with their infinite variety are in
fact unchangeable. The main features of the family law, of succession, of the laws protecting human life, of the general rules
as to obligations and as to property will be just as sound when
Macauley's New Zealander shall be sitting on a broken arch of London Bridge; but a great part of the law is relative and the result
of race and time. Many of its rules are '{ariable. There is a great
mass of law that as we have seen is not connected with morality. It
might just as well be otherwise. It exists because it !s necessary
to have some rule. This part of law was seen very clearly to be
a development of the national life. It has nothing to do with the
school of natural law or its tenets. Another school, therefore, arose
which laid its whole emphasis upon the historical development of
the law as it progressed in orderly succession from one rule to another. Hugo and Savigny were its founders, but they had found
nothing new. They believed that by showing that the law had
developed naturally and regularly, there was no necessity for assuming that there was any system of natural law. The reasons for
the law need not be looked for in reason; there was no longer any
danger in denying natural law, for it was not admitted by the
denial that all law was purely arbitrary and therefore indefensible.
Law was shown to be historically a necessity, and a sure development of human history not created by arbitrary human will, but
by the steady social development of a nation. This school even
went further and said that the germ of every nation's law was in the
race and all the development of the law was the growth and development of the germ. This is the organic theory attempted to
be proven biologically by Spencer and his imitators. This school
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was bound to fall for the reason that all law becomes a purely
animistic development; whatever is, is right, because it could not
be otherwise. Positive or existing law becomes not only the only
law, but the only possible law. Human will and purpose, the conscious effort on man's part to improve society becomes a myth as
baseless as the labors of Hercules. Men instinctively felt and knew
that they were not helpless, that there was an ideal toward which
they could strive. Then came the school of Stahl and Lasson who
maintained the proposition of the ideal system of natural law existing along with the positive law. But here again they grasped but
a part of the truth since their ideal system was non-existent, a mere
set of legal ideals, and must be necessarily a growing and improving system because it was the product of growing and improving
human minds. The folly of comparing an ideal as one existing
system with another system existing as a fact, the impossibility of
putting conceptions so different in their natures upon any common
basis offered no difficulty to men who could identify the thinking
subject with the thought-of object. At last Stammler tried to
reconcile the historical and the natural law schools by his theory
of "a natural law with a variable content", an improving and growing
sense of justice. This would be well enough if there were not many
things in the law which are unchangeable and eternal. But the
existence of international law is easily reconcilable with the tenets
of the historical school, and it is a necessity to the school of natural
law.
Savigny being of French descent had the courage of his convictions and boldly asserted the folly of legislation and the impossibility
of men changing the law by their conscious purpose. The dogmas of
the historical school ceased to reign as a new school had seized the
thought that only positive law does or can exist and on that basis
had founded the so-called analytical school whose great names are
Austin and, with faltering and reluctant steps, Sir Henry Maine.
They were really a combination of Hobbes and Bentham. That was
law which was law in a particular country at a particular time, and
that alone. This is true, but it is nothing to the purpose. This
school first appropriated the absolutist theory of Hobbes that law
was rules imposed by the ruler upon the subject, and they insisted
upon legislation to change the law. Austin defined law as the set
of rules set by men as politically superior to other men as politically
subject. These men politically superior are the government whether
it be Kaiser, the Council of Ten, a ruling oligarchy, a representative parliament, a congress, or a popular meeting. It included
everything from Khammurabi to a meeting of the miners of a min-

GERMAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

345

:ng district in early California. This school deified legislation and
:i.ccepted Bentham's crude theories of legislation. A German named
Jhering took the thought, called it Purpose in Law, and boldly
::laimed to be its inventor.
This theory was compelled to account for the fact that law was
mainly a natural growth out of previous conditions. Legislation,
:onscious purpose, touched it very lightly. The historical school had
deprecated legislation, had insisted that religious beliefs and customs
had made the greater part of law when re-enforced by the reasonings of jurisprudence. The law was the work of silently working
forces not the will of a law giver, and the greater part of the rules
enforced as law in any court were not imposed by any superior.
This objection was met by the proposition that the rules of law enforced by courts were permitted by the superior, and therefore imposed by it. At once the theory was in the hornet's nest that the
law permits nothing, it commands or forbids. If all that is permitted is law, then all human conduct is regulated by the command
of the superior, a reductio ad absttrdmn. But there was a preliminary difficulty to be met even before the one just indicated. Half
the statute book was like our Sherman law repealed by unanimous
consent and not enforced in any way. It was found that the consent of the governed was in the end necessary to complete legislation. So Markby adds to Austin's definition the qualification that
the rules of law must be generally obeyed. It seemed, then, that
the sovereign command did not make law at all, but the general consent of the obeying subjects made it, which fact destroyed Austin's
definition and the law was defined as by the historical school. Holland deserted the question of the causation of law and said that
law is a system of rules governing men's external acts enforced by
a sovereign political authority, and since law is enforced by judicial
tribunals, it seemed to follow that the enforcement by a judicial
tribunal was the test of law, and hence the step was easy to the
thought that courts made law. This was followed without conscious
assent by our Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Hor.MES who
worked off with no little cynical, though, no doubt, concealed, amusement on his innocent brethren (who had never troubled themselves
about a philosophy of law) the definition of law that the court was
every day denying and against which a hundred of its decisions
could be quoted, that "law is a statement of the circumstances in
which the public force will be brought to bear through the courts".78
This seemed to the court the perfectly innocent statement that if a
fS
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rule is law the courts will enforce it. Courts are the only people
who do not know what a violent presumption this is. They seem
imbued with the idea that they follow the law. The most that can
be allowed them is that generally they try to do so. But the sense
in which the court took Justice HOLMES' proposition is not what he
meant. The sentence means the exact opposite. It means that a
rule is law because the courts enforce it, and for no other reason,
and that a rule does not exist until particular circumstances are before a court; and, therefore, it is the court that makes the law, a
proposition once again urged by Justice HOLMES in another case
in a dissenting opinion, where he showed what he really meant and
the majority of the court overruled him. 79
The theory that courts make law is the thesis maintained in Gray's
Nature and Sources of Law, but the very instances he cites prove
that courts do not make law, for the simple reason that the cases
he cites are all based on pre-existing rules. 80 Any opinion can be
read and the decision will be seen to be a deduction from a more
general rule. An application of a rule to a new case does not make
a new rule. Mr. Gray puts the case of "what was the law in the
time of Richard Coeur de Lion on the liability of a telegraph company to the persons to whom a message was sent." This illustrates
that he is not thinking about law at all, but about the rules of thinking. He states a concrete case of fact and asks what general rule
of law would apply in the time of the Lion Hearted. The answer is
plain. His concrete case was then non-existent, and it is mentaJiy
impossible to conceive of a rule of law governing non-existent human
conduct. Professor Gray has simply perpetrated a psychological
absurdity. He also does not see the difference between a rule of
law and a judgment on a concrete state of facts. He might as well
ask for the law among the Wanyamwezi as to fellow servants. The
difference is a matter of the rules of thinking which must be settled
before you attempt to apply them.
It happens that we as well as all civilized countries have judicial
tribunals. These judicial tribunals ascertain as best they can what
"Kuhn v. Fairmount Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349. If a man desires to see where the
idea that courts make law lands a rational mind, let him analyze the dissenting, opinion.
If he thinks it sound, he may be absolutely certain that he does not know what Jaw is.
so See his whole chapter iv. The opposite view in the book of a very great lawyer,
James C. Carter, Law, Its Origin, Growth and Function, is not put very convincingly,
because he is trying to deny that legislation makes law, a palpable error of fact. In
17 Col. Law Rev. is a paper which contains more error than can anywhere be found
in the same space. In the Bering Sea Arbitration, Mr. Carter in order to support the
absurd position of our country threw overboard his beliefs, and maintained a philosophy
of right theory of international law. He was, of course, utterly demolished by Sir
Charles Russell.
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are the general rules of law. They do not consciously invent rules
for they all recognize that any judgment which they give is founded
upon a major premise which must be an existing rule of law. If
they do not do this, they are not performing a judicial act. Suppose
a court should avow that out of its own head it made a rule, would
it legislate? The answer is no, because the application which they
make of the rule is to a past state of facts. Therefore when a man
talks of a court making law, he must be referred to treatises on
psychology and logic. The fact that courts announce rules of law
is a mere accident. Suppose that they followed the rule of merely
announcing their judgments without giving reasons. For nine courts
out of ten this would be an excellent rule. Years ago a judge of
the Territorial Federal Court in Wyoming told me that he had become so disgusted with stupid reversals that at one term when he
had twelve chancery cases, he took the six cases where the complainants' names came earlier in the alphabet and decided those for
the complainants, the remaining six he decided for the defendants.
He gave no reasons. They were all appealed, and those were the
only cases at any term which were all affirmed. If this story is
non vero, it is certainly ben trovato.
No one not blinded by our system would ever suppose that courts
make law. It has never occurred to a European lawyer to make
such a supposition, because they have not our system of precedents.
This idea of law is our peculiarly provincial contribution. There
are literally hundreds of legal systems in full working order on
this earth today, whose rules are absolutely binding and observed,
which are neither laid down by a superior power nor announced
nor enforced by courts. The mere accident of machinery has been
mistaken for the characteristic of the abstract idea. Law is a concept, a generalized abstraction attained by mental processes. Generalized concepts such as horse are type ideas which result from
observation, but a generalized concept like law is itself a higher
abstraction from other abstract notions, which exist only in the
mind. The various rules of law are themselves abstract generalizations. The attempt to define law is simply the attempt to find what
the various abstract rules have in common. It is not coercion by
state power because that element is no part of the abstract rules.
It is not the fact that it is laid down by a superior power because
the rules have not that element in common. It is not the fact that
the rules are stated by courts, for that fact is not a common element. Nor do any of these facts enter into the abstraction. The
mere abstraction would not be important if the definitions above
did not exclude public international law. It is among the disciples
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of the_ analytical school that international law is being beset in the
house of its friends, of those who ought to be its defenders (in courts
which have gone so far as to say that the rules of public international law are a part of the municipal law), who are "reiterating
stab on stab". Certainly we cannot give up public international law
for a Philistine idea of the Saurian Cretaceous period in law, which
is refuted by the laws of thinking, by the truths of history and
by the demands of justice, which all require a rule of law antecedent to a judicial decision.
There is a book by Joseph H. Beale of Harvard,81 a part of which
has appeared, which is to become the definitive treatise on private
international law or as he very properly prefers to call it, the conflict of Jaws. It gives the strongest promise of being the best legal
work done in this generation. It unites industry and erudition to
keenly discriminating thought and in it the author has exhausted
the abstract concept of law. His studies were in a department
where he was required to free himself from the usual erroneous
limitations. He saw a whole system of law that was practically
virgin ground to the law giver. It bore the marks of the labors
of many centuries of the natural law thinkers. It gave all the proofs
of its noble historical origin, and its orderly development. It has
been illustrated by the labors of jurists. Mr. Beale himself had
written a book upon the great mediaeval authority Bartolus, 82 which
every lawyer who is better than a ''leguleiits, catttits atqite acutus",
ought to read with delight. It was positive law, daily applied by
the courts in many different lands, and yet no tribunal existed whose
jurisdiction enabled it to lay down the law for all its different
spheres of operation. Here was a body of law that no one could
deny and yet it rested on nothing else than the age old sanction
of law, its general acceptance. He saw, none more clearly, that
this body of law like all other law, had a set of general principles
which gave it standing as science, but which blossomed into many
particular rules. He defines law as "the body of general principles
and of particular rules in accordance with which civil rights are
created and regulated and wrongs prevented and redressed". He
uses civil rights as a term of widest import, and he points out that
the characteristic of law as a living system, is the fact of its acceptance. This definition of law is reconcilable with all its attributes.
81 Beale, The Conflict of Laws, p. 132.
In Korkunov, Theory of Law, there is an
attempt to define law as a limiting of the sphere of rights, which does not meet the dif·
ficulties.
• 2 The book on Bartol us may be read with the life, much more sketchy, in Great
Continental Jurists.
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It leaves scope and play for the gross errors of courts.83 It gives
room for public international law in the fact of acceptance by all
civilized nations, and in the fact that rights are created by it and
wrongs redressed according to its rules. When Germany attempts
to repudiate this law, she is refuted by her own jurists. Practically
all writers agree that the effect of law is to delimit rights in one person with corresponding duties in others to respect those rights. This
situation creates legal relations. So far all are agreed as to the situation between citizens. But all agree that the citizen stands in legal
relations with his government. If this be so, the citizen must have
rights complemented by duties on the part of the government. In
our country these rights and duties are defined by the organic law.
But all agree that governments bear legal relations toward one another, and those relations are and must be defined by law, which
is international law, as the Germans admit. One of them, Kohler,
as we shall see, trying to account for his statements as to the existence and binding force upon nations of international law, emits the
ludicrous Teutonic roar that his "honest German nature" had been
83 It is painful to have to record another of Justice Holmes' careless and debonair
utterances. In Kawananokoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349, he must have completely misled
his associates into concurring in a statement of the law that is not only not correct, but
actively vicious. He says: "Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the
immunity of a sovereign power from suit without its own permission, but the answer
has been public property since before the days of Hobbes. Leviathan Chap. 26, 2. A
sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory,
but on the logical and practical ground that there can he no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the" right depends. 'Car on peut bien recevoir
loy d'autruy, mais il est impossible par nature de se donner Ioy', Bodin Republique i,
chap. 8 (Ed. 1629), p. 132". The French sentence means, "For one can very well receive law from another, but it is naturally impossible to give law to oneself". Here we
have the German theory that the government cannot be bound by law put forward in
its rawest form. The authorities quoted are the Philosopher of Malmesbury, the advocate
of royal absolutism, and a Frenchman who believed in quidquid principi placuit habet
legis vigorem. Justice Holmes never meant to assert such a thing. His associates
never would have concurred in such doctrine. It was contrary to a hundred decisions
of the court to the effect that the government could bind itself by laws, and the courts
bad always enforced them. Tbe doctrine stated was not the ground of the rule. That
doctrine was obsolete theory except in Germany. If the statement is true, the govern·
ment cannot be bound by the law. The statement is astonishing and to all Americans
who understand it, intensely humiliating. The point decided, however, was correctly decided. The reason for the rule is public convenience, for all sorts of actions would be
brought against the government if the rule did not exist. But if opinions make law, it
is law today in this benighted country that the government cannot bind itself by the
laws it promulgates. There is no logical basis for such a rule and can be none, and one
naturally inquires of our Supreme Court, que le diable faites·vo11s da11s cette galere. But
this is the trouble when a judge announces law on his own researches. Bracton, Fortescue
and Coke denied his proposition. It was never true in Imperial Rome nor in France.
See Le Maxime, Princeps Legibus Solutus Est by Esmein, Essays in Legal History, 1913,
Vinogradolf. I can only quote Coke's words in Calvin's case, I think, that Justice Holmes
has given "a damnable and damned opinion".
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deceived into telling the truth. But the fact that private international law exists is proof positive that .a public jus gentittm exists.
As we have seen, there is a certain stage in the development of law
where a legal profession necessarily comes into existence. This
legal profession after its advent will determine the acceptance of
law and its meaning. Just as in mediaeval Year Books, no writ
would_ stand against the opinion of the sergeants, so no principle
of law will stand today against the opinion of the profession. One
of the practical objections to the judicial-decision analytical school
is that there is unloaded on the science of jui;-isprudence all the manifold mistakes of courts. There_ is no certainty that a decision has
stated a rule until the statement has stood the test of time and
acceptap.ce. It is not necessary to refer to cases where the courts
have made mistakes by first enunciating one rule and later finding
they were wrong. We may take a case where a court has had two
identical cases before it and mirabile dictu has decided them in the
same way, applying a principle or a rule. One case is appealed and
reversed. The other is not appealed, and the judgment stands. The
first rule of justice which is impartiality, has been violated by an
accident. Shuffling out of this difficulty, they say that law is made
by courts of last resort. If so, whether there be law in a court
decision, depends upon the accident of appeal, a wholly nonsensical
conclusion. Again a decision is made and an appeal taken. In
the meantime another case between the parties involving the same
point comes on for trial. By the doctrine of res judicata the first
decision decides the second case. It also is appealed. On the same
day in the same court, the two cases are decided. The first case
is reversed, the second is affirmed, rightly because the effect of the
first judgment was not suspended by appeal. This very case has
happened. So far as the ultimate rights of the parties are concerned,
two exactly contrary decisions have been made by the same court
at the same time on the same subject-matter. This is the law of
our Supreme_ Court of the United States, yet no one would contend that the accidents of litigation made two diverse rules of law.
It is merely certain that a great injustice was done by a clumsy
procedure. Now shall lawyers admit that all the errors and mistakes of fallible men in the courts shall be unloaded on jurisprudence
which is the noblest product of the human intellect? It is against
these puny mistaken men that this great science has been waging
her war for aeons and will continue to wage it long after we are
gone.
There has lately been proposed another school of legal philosophy
called Sociological Jurisprudence which is said to have given up
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the search for what law is and has concentrated 1ts efforts persumably on what it ought to be.. Since there never was any jurisprudence
that was not sociological, this school must profess "jurisprudence as
is jurisprudence". It is claimed, however, in all apparent seriousness that this is a new school. It is said to be seeking for the ideal
and enduring side of positive law, but this is merely the natural-law
school given a new name, and curiously enough this hypothetical
school is said to blame the natural law school for doing just what
it proposes to attempt. Then it is said that this school seeks to define the legal order84 rather than to reach a definition of law. But
this is the analytical school over again and Kohler repudiates his
disciple, even as Bentham repudiated Dumont, and asserts that
philosophy of law is the philosophic study of evolutionary processes
by which law is formed, which is the historical school over again
with certain K1tltur "Persicos apparahts". In this school we are
shocked to find classed together Comte, Spencer, Ward, Jhering,
Duguit, Sternberg, Berolzheimer, Merkel, Gumplowicz, Demogue,
Kohler, Post and Dahn. M. Duguit between Jhering and Sternberg
must feel (I say it in all reverence) as if he were being crucified
between two thieves. sG This new school seems to be a hasty and
unjustifiable generalization from Fritz Berolzheimer's book. Fritz
is a perfect Fritz of Fritzes for he does not always tell the whole
truth, but he never supposed, I venture to say, that the Neo-Kantians
would be classed with the Neo-Hegelians and the Utilitarians. These
people have literally nothing in common. They abuse each other
like pirates. Kohler says Jhering has "a wholly unphilosophical
head". Jhering trounces almost everybody. Spencer has nothing
in common with these high prerogative divine-right-of-the-Kaiser
Germans, nor with the Utilitarians. The school includes biologists,
utilitarians and transcendentalists. It is much as if some new
Cuvier should arise and announce in tones of thunder that he had
discovered a new species of animals which all had this fact in common, that they ate food, and that the species comprised the elephant,
the rhinoceros, the tiger, the eagle, the zebra, the jackal, the lion,
the baboon and the vulture. But where in this list are Binding and
Bierling with their "norms" which look like a new species of legal
"worms''; they are analytical jurists ; and where are Seydel, Preuss,
"' The "legal order" is one of those convenient vague German phrases with "a variable
content'' that mean nothing. Only one who has followed the German "subjective" and
"objective" through almost a hundred different senses, most of them contradictory, can
form any adequate notion of this vagueness and looseness of thought.
ss See the articles in 24 and 25 Har. Law Rev. on Sociological Jurisprudence and 15
Col Law Rev. I have not verified the number of the last volume for one reading was
quite enough. •
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and Gerber? Berolzheimer left those out of his book, so the projector did not have them to classify. The inventor himself is the
American protagonist of this school, but now comes Professor
Kocourek and says that the inventor does· not belong here, and
horresco referens, is in "a hostile camp of legal philosophy". This
is very mystifying, especially as Professor Kocourek after his attempt to comprehend this exhaustive work of Fritz ventures on certain schools himself. Those schools are the Positivist, the N eoKantians and Neo-Hegelians, and he evidently classes the inventor,
"one of our greatest juridicial scholars", along with Comte as a
Positivist86 while he rejects the Natural-Law, the Analytical and the
Historical schools altogether, although if he could have foreseen
what t4.e inventor was going to do in his elaborate disquisition on
the Natural-Law, Analytical and Historical schools, while classing
all of Professor Kocourek's three schools together as one. school,
he would not have been, we may hope, so temerarious. As it is,
his classification has been treated by Dean Pound after Count von
Luxburg's recipe of "spurlos versenkt". Both professors agree, however, in saying that Kohler, who is the elephant of sociology's new
school, is "the first of living jurists".
We dismiss the Sociological School of jurists as too involved
"for human nature's daily food". 87 If we attempt to generalize
from the lucubrations of the schools, we see no reason to change
Professor Beale's definition of law. It stands as an accurate description of the abstract conception of law. But the astonishing
thing is that any one should have treated any of these schools seriously. They practically agree on the facts. They differ on the
theories. Each one seizes a part of the truth and proceeds to
exploit his parcel as if it were the whole estate, and thereby commits waste on the inheritance which all life tenants must avoid.
VIL
GERMAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS.

No one is infallible, not even the Pope. In I868, John Hay,
then an attache at Madrid, where he had written his lovely book
"Castilian Days", came through Paris and told with great joy
a story that was current in Madrid of that "amiable old pessimist",
Pius IX. The Ecumenical Council of the Church under direct in.. See Kocourek's Introd. Kohler's Philosophy of Law, p. xv.
sr In Har. Law Rev. xxxi, 373, Nathan Isaacs of the Cincinnati Law School has
ventured on further schools.
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spiration from on high had pronounced the dogma of Pius' infallibility. But he had his doubts and to test his infallibility he had
been trying his new powers on the weather and on lottery tickets
with disastrous results to the dogma. 88 It is rather a pity that certain professors of law have not some such method of ascertaining
their own fallibility. But here let me say that the larger class of
the law professors assume that they are to teach law and have no
roving commission to assault all its rules and to abuse the legal
profession. They know how difficult a matter it is to be a worthy
member of such a profession. No one should attempt to apologize
for all lawyers. In this country, the profession is burdened with
many, perhaps a great majority, who have never been illuminated by
"the gladsome light of jurisprudence". Many of them are mere
"hacks" not even persons of good education, but no one can deny
that in the history of this country lawyers have given a good account of themselves. There exists too often, a sort of hostility
between the practical, practicing lawyer and those theoretical professorial colleagues, who think that they have become the depositaries
of ultimate truth. It is mainly due to the fact that the theorist shows
so little actual knowledge of jurisprudence as a practical art. Lawyers are constantly seeing deliverances of the theorists that would
not stand a day's practical test. The theorists are constantly carping
at the profession for its imperviousness to ideas and its sordidness.
The lawyers reply with truth that the professors have no conception of how carefully, minutely and thoroughly, with what liberality of thought, an important case is prepared for trial, with what
great research and attention to detail. If a question of statutory
construction is involved, all the considerations which the theorists
think themselves to have discovered, but which in fact have been
the common basis of argument for many years, are carefully
weighed, all the material that the Historical or the Natural-Law or
the Analytical schools can furnish is searched and pondered; all
the light possible from former analogous statutes is obtained, the
situation the statute was designed to meet, the social reasons demanding it, the reasons in existing law for its enactment, the general public policy involved, the demands of abstract justice and
right, the interference, if any, with general rules-all is placed before the court; very often it is the useless task of margaritas ante
porcos. All the reasons for a liberal or strict construction, the appeal to the general spirit of the enactment, all the different rules
MThis tale is in John Bigelow's Retrospect, I think in volume four. But any one
who is desirous of verifying the story may consult the index. He will find diverting and
some valuable material.
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for interpretation are urged and debated, weighed and tested. The
lawyers say that when one of them arises in court all his fallacies,
shortcomings, lack of information and immaturity of reflection are
exposed, while the professorial theorist never receives a criticism
or reply, and thinks that because he can escape a lot of illy informed
students without correction, he would pass muster everywhere. Even
the judge upon the bench must submit, very often with ill grace, to
an ex1!-austive examination of his opinion and exposure of any
inadequacy in his reasoning. It is true that he can act like the
professor and resent. criticism. Very often he does so, but the
fact is not altered. The lawyers know how great and difficult a
matter is the law, how much insight is required, how a perfect system on_paper would be a monstrosity in actual use, how the law
is always loaded with human imperfections, lack of ability, incapacity to discriminate, personal prejudices or ridiculous hobbies,
how the judicial head seems often to be constructed of non-conducting material; and the lawyers claim that if the theorists were put
into court, made to prepare and argue great questions, they would
find that their new discoveries were as old as the hills and they
would discover that their cackling over new discoveries had not even
the hen's excuse of the production of one actual egg. The theorists
accuse the lawy~rs of narrowness and intense conservatism and
charge that they have no confidence in legislation. The lawyer replies
that owing to the numberless mistakes which he sees, the silly and
stupid statutes without number, he would be a criminal, if he were
not a conservative; that the theorists with their Jacobinical offer~
ings, abuse of law, decrying of the methods for the administration
of justice and their attempts to unload their crude designs on a
jurisprudence tested by the years are irritating and dangerous.
They point to the law, to what it has done for civilization, and
say that it suffers enough from human imperfections, that the theorists are wrong in trying to hack our aged mother to pieces. They
point to the vast complexity of human affairs, to the immense burdens the law is called upon to bear and answer:
"Yes, we arraign her, but she
The weary Titan with deaf
Ears and labor dimmed eyes,
Regarding neither to right
Nor left, goes passively by,
Bearing on shoulders immense,
Atlantean, the load
Well nigh not to be borne
Of the too vast orb of her fate."
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It may be admitted that the practical lawyer does not exhibit a very
receptive attitude toward legal philosophy. He can see nothing
very valuable in English legal philosophy so far as it goes. Salmond
or Miller or Amos or Austin or Lorimer are not of any value to him.
Sir Henry Maine's books are interesting and suggestive. The Common Law of Holmes was exceedingly good if it had been true, but
it had at any rate the rarest and best of all things, charm and inspiration and faultless diction.
But the lawyer is told that Germany is the home of legal philosophy. Now when we are told of this great philosophical literature, we are skeptical, but we naturally recur to the books that are
open to all. There are Kant's, Hegel's, Puchta's, Jhering's and
Kohler's Philosophies of Law, beside numerous other works. One
opens Hegel's Philosophy of Law and one's mind goes back over the
fugaces annos to the days when he was an undergraduate. The
Universities were then filled with those who had gone to Germany
to draw inspiration from the bubbling fountains of philosophical
verbosity. The Germans had done great things in the world, the
new German Empire was stupendous . and nothing succeeds like
success. The great apparent good of Bismarck filled the world,
the evil that was to live and fester and breed after him, was not
yet known. The Universities were full of seminar courses and
every one was talking German methods. It fell to my lot to sit
under the ministrations of one of the great and early exponents of
German philosophy, George S. Morris, whose death was so untimely. We threw ourselves with youthful enthusiasm upon Kant,
Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Especially the German theory of the
state was in the air. Our lecturers on political economy were talking the Jacobinical stuff made popular by the German professorial
"socialists of the chair'. The watchword then was Geist, intelligence
applied to state affairs and in training the population, resulting in an
Intelligenzstaat. Matthew Arnold's Culture and Anarchy and
Friendship's Garland had preached the healing power of Geist in
lovely and moving tones. We panted for enlightenment as the heart
panteth for the water-brooks. We pored over the Pure Reason and
the Phenomonology of Spirit, but we found nothing to quench our
thirst. Imagine our horror and dismay to find that Kant, the starting point of German philosophy, had nothing new; it was the old
agnosticism dressed up in many words. He was a Scotchman and
had borrowed his ideas from Hume. He had once shown signs of
trying to talk of free institutions, and had been promptly suspended
and taught a bitter lesson, so that he never ventured into that field
again, but had signed a full recantation to the effect that the sov-
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ereign power in the state was the existing government and that its
law was holy; "A law which is so. holy and inviolable that it is
practically a crime even to cast doubt upon it, or to suspend its operation even for a moment, is represented of itself as necessarily
derived from some Supreme, unblameable law-giver. And this
is the meaning of the maxim, 'All authority is from God', which
proposition does not express the historical foundation of the civil
constitution, but an ideal principle of the practical reason. [We
noted that this was not imputed to the pure reason .(die reine
Vernunft), which was -concerned with truth, but to that practical
reason (die praktische Vernunft), which was involved in his salary.] Hence it follows that the supreme power in the state has
only rights and no (compulsory) duties toward the subject." This
was the old divine right of kings, or of government, which Kant
had made a tenet of the practical reason and to stop it, the English
a hundred years before had cut off one king's head and chased another from the realm.
So we turned to Hegel and found that he strummed the same tune.
He was opposed to all free government and representative institutions. In international law he preached the doctrine that nothing
was binding on a state, that states were in Hobbes' condition of
"the war of all against all". He, too, held the doctrine of sovereignty
vested in the monarch, who was a person and therefore made the
state a personality. The power of the monarch was not derivative,
but his right was a becoming unto itself, which in Hegel's language
means absolute reality. "Accordingly, the conception which represents the right of the monarch to be founded upo11 divine authority
is wholly exact, because in such notion is contained the unconditioned part of the monarch's right". Here we found again the Germans feeding on the dry husks of divine right which had been
burned in 1688 in England and in France in 1789.
Fries, a German publicist of the time when they still dared to
think, said that Hegel's theory of the state had grown "not in the
garden of science, but on the dunghill of servility". This is an accurate description, and our philosophy of law is expected to roost
upon that dunghill. Although Hegel conceals his views on jurisprudence, we can discard his trinitarian system of thesis antithesis
and synthesis and approximate his conceptions. Law he conceives
as the antithesis of customary morality and their synthesis is true
morality. The individual and the group are opposed but they are
united in the family. The family and the civil society are opposed
and they unite in the state. At bottom his idea, if he had one, is
an attempt to reconcile individualism as opposed to society.
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Efforts had been made to apply this German philosophy of law
to our political institutions. At that time in the consulship of
Arthur, the effort had been made by Mulford's "The Nation", a
work long forgotten, I suppose. He propounded the following
propositions in an attempt to apply the Hegelian theory to a state
without a monarch; that the nation is founded in the nature of man
and is a natural growth and relationship, is continuous and is an
organism, a conscious organism, a moral organism and a moral
personality. He stopped short of the Hegelian identification of the
existing government with divine right. The interesting point in
his book is the discrimination which he made between the nation
as the social aggregate, the people, and the government, called the
commonwealth. It was apparent to him that the people of the
United States, the social aggregate, must be considered as formed
and existing prior to our adoption of a constitution, otherwise the
conception of Calhoun that the nation was a mere compact between
states and therefore an artificial, not a natural and necessary growth
and development, indivisible and eternal, could be fairly maintained.
But the theory of Mulford had been already stated by Webster with
precision in his speech, The Constitution not a Compact :89 "The
Union is the association of the people, under a constitution or government, uniting their power, joining together their highest interests, cementing their present enjoyments, and blending, in one indivisible mass, all their hopes for the future". This is the theory,
the existence of a nation, a social aggregate, anterior to the constitution, which is the doctrine of our Supreme Court. In Chisholm
v. Georgia00 the distinction between the government and the state,
as the social organization, is noted in the phrase that the government
has often claimed precedence over the state, which is the artificial
person, the complete body of free persons united together for their
common benefit, to enjoy peaceably what is their own and to do
justice to others. And Chief Justice ]AY said: "The Revolution, or
rather the Declaration of Independence, found the people already
united for general purposes and at the same time providing for their
more domestic concerns by state governments and other temporary
arrangements". In Pennhallow v. Doane,91 the same assertion was
made of the existence before the constitution of the one political
body, which raised armies, conducted military operations, issued bills
of credit, received and sent ambassadors and made treaties. In
so \Vebster, \Vorks vi,
Dalt. 455.
1113 Dall. 54-

.. 2
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Te%as v. White, 92 the court noted that the word 'state' is used first
for the political community, second for the territory of the community and third for the government thereof. But the society constitutes the state, and the united society is one state and one country.
"The Uniol} never was a purely artificial and arbitrary relation. It
grew out of common origin, mutual sympathies, similar interests
and geographical relations. It was confirmed and strengthened by
war and received definite form in the Articles of Confederation".
In Lane v. Oregon, 93 it was asserted that the United States existed
before the constitution. In Loan Association v. Topeka, 9 4. Judge
MILLER asserted that outside of the .constitutional limitations on
the government were limitations arising from the nature of free
government and beyond the control of even the state, the political
aggregate. But Mulford did not see that his theory refuted Hegel's
identification of the state, the nation, the social aggregate, with the
particular form of government. Later, in England, attempts were
made to furbish up the theory in a new form in Green's Principles
of Obligation and Bosanquet's .Philosophical Theory of the State.
Germany had grown into one political community. Events had disposed of Hegel's theory, yet the Germans have never admitted it.
It having become united, the rulers of the different states, the various kings, grand dukes and dukes (there was no nonsense about
the people) by their agreement had constituted a government for
the already existing German Empire. This ended the Hegelian
theory and now Bavarian legal philosophers are claiming that the
Empire is merely a league, that the God-given states are still the
different social aggregates. They have adopted the Calhoun theory
and applied it to the German Empire. But at the present time one
who would deny the social unity of Germany must surely be daft.
But we ought not to part from Hegel without a specimen of his
line of thought. In his Phanomenologie des Geistes I take a sentence at random from his great chapter: "When reason observes,
this pure unity of ego and existence, the unity of subjectivity and
objectivity, of for-itself-ness and in-itself-ness, this unity is immanent, has the character of implicitness or of being; and consciousness of reason finds itself".95 This union of the thinking mind,
the subject, and the thought of object is perfectly apparent to Hegel.
92 7 Wall. 700. Here Chase stumbled on a thought, but like the politician he was,
be proceeded to dilute it in the next sentences.
.. 7 Wall. 71 •
.. 20 Wall. 655. This is a good specimen of Miller's rugged writing. He was a strong
legal personality. If be bad- been educated and bad bad the balance that comes from
wide reading in the law, there would have been none greater.
"'Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind (translation Baillie), p. 430.
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He assumes it. I see my hat, that objective thing, the hat, creates
an impression on my mind. That impression is a part of my mind.
The mind was for itself. The hat was in itself. The two things
unite in the hat impression and not until then am I conscious of reason, but because I am so conscious the thinking mind has become
one with the objective thing. What could be plainer? A man's
mind finds itself in the in-itself-ness of his hat, while his pure ego
"talks through its hat". Schopenhauer in his Essay on Style says
of this sort of work: "The mask of unintelligibility holds out the
longest; this is only in Germany, however, where it was introduced
by Fichte, perfected by Schelling and attained its highest climax
finally in Hegel, always with the happiest results. And yet nothing
is easier than to write so that no one can understand. * * * The
Germans from force of habit read page after page of all kinds
of such verbiage without getting any definite idea of what the
author really means. * * * Obscurity and vagueness of expression
are at all times and everywhere a very bad sign. * * * Those writers who construct difficult, obscure, involved and ambiguous phrases
most certainly do not rightly know what it is they wish to say:they have only a ditll consciousness of it which is still struggling to
put itself into thought; they also often wish to conceal that in reality
they have nothing to say. Like Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, they
wish to appear to know what they do not know, to think what they
do not think, and to say what they do not say."
Kohler is constantly imputing to Hegel the application of the
idea of evolution to history as if he were the inventor of it. This
is a part of the general German theory of claiming everything, and
is characteristic of their mental dishonesty. As a matter of fact,
the whole idea of evolution is absent from Hegel's system. He
could not have had it because to the idea of man's evolution his
presence on this earth for at the lowest 250,000 years is necessary, and Hegel believed in Archbishop Usher's chronology, by
which man came on earth 4004 B. C. with the same mind that he
has today. In Hegel's Philosophy of History he does not conceive
of one form of civilization passing into something higher, but he
take~ certain races as typical of certain manifestations of reason in
humanity. This is entirely foreign to what they call Entwickelimgsgeschichte. This uncouth word, meaning historical evolution, did
not exist for Hegel. Hegel conceives of right as a development of
reasoning, not as a product of the evolution of the mind.
And this takes us on to Puchta who denies Hegel's whole assumption that Reason produces the notion of right. Puchta says
that freedom is the foundation of right, which is the essential prin-
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ciple of all law. Hence, says Puchta, it follows that it is not from
the notion of Reason that we get to Right, as the principle of law. 96
This illustrates the superficial character of the German philosophy
of law. It is all bare assertion. Freedom, that is to say, freedom
from the aggression of others, is the foundation of law, because
it is one of the basic notions of justice, not freedom from all restraint, but the social freedom which is that which is compatible
with equal freedom in others. This is jural freedom postulating
equality and general rules of law applicable to all alike. But in order to develop this complex concept of justice as an original moral
idea, some power of reasoning in men was necessary. Then he proceeds: "At first, at his creation, man was put into this free central
sphere.. Only when he had fallen from it, did necessity as such
appear, and only then did the exercise of Reason begin,-a high
gift certainly and indispensable to the fallen nature". This sort
of stuff is what Puchta places as an introduction to his great treatise
on Roman law, and he proceeds in this mediaeval style to develop
a conflict between the principle of Right and that of Morality ! This
is a favorite thesis of the German school, and they try to put it into
practice. He has no understanding of the subject at all, but in regard
to Roman law he states that it developed equality before the law, but
not freedom. Here is the usual German confusion. He is using
freedom in two senses without knowing it. Jural freedom is one
thing; that freedom the Romans had because they had an almost
perfect system of private law. Political freedom in the sense of
taking an equal part with others in matters of government, they did
not ha""'"'9ut political freedom in that sense had nothing to do with
the basic idea of justice or law until the idea of equality became
highly developed as a political tenet. Anyone is at liberty to read
this worn-out literature, but it has been cast behind by the knowledge of this age.
We may take now two books of Jhering. One is The Struggle
for Law, the other, Purpose in Law. The sole idea in The Struggle for Law is that law results from every man contending for his
rights, that it is this constant clash between human beings that
develops law, and if men do not insist upon their rights, no law
will be developed. The necessary result of this would be that if
men did not violate other men's rights and everybody was lawabiding, the law would be destroyed. Jhering was not a philosopher.
In this country his style would have fitted excellently a professional
oo Puchta, Outlines (Hastie's Trans), p. 5, 6. Mr. Hastie's introduction leads one
to think that he must be actually descended from that Judge Staunton, whom the irreverent Year Book reporters called Harvie le Hastie.
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exhorter. A practical lawyer rejects his creeds as nonsense. "Blessed
are the peacemakers" will do more good than a hundred such
treatises. When to go to law is a most difficult problem, unless
you are a fomenter of petty village litigation, or paid by some governmental power an unearned salary to stir up litigation.
His book, The Spirit of Roman Law, outside its erudition, which
is possible to any one who can write in a note book, has a great
reputation on account of a number of original views. One of his
most unpardonable performances was to slander the memory of the
great Roman lawyer Gaius. No one knows who Gaius was or where
he lived, so that as to him the Germans are particularly strong, especially Mommsen. Jhering pondering a problem of Roman law, proceeded, he tells us, 97 to summon the spirit of Gaius for cross-examination through the clouds of cigar smoke, and most villainous
smoke it was, according to my experience, if the cigar was "made
in Germany". Gaius appeared and Jhering describes him as "a
strange figure of a man, tall, shrivelled, slightly bow-legged, with
freckled brow and the general air of a schoolmaster". In fact he
was a typical German underfed pedagogue. Let us hope that even
the fat ones now look thin and shrivelled. But what an atrocious
slander! Gaius was a fine, upstanding Roman, with eagle-face and
clear-cut features, a high official of the great emperors, Hadrian and
the Antonines, and for the German savages who were then carrying on barbarous forays on the confines of the Empire, he had a
limitless horror and contempt.
As to Jhering's Zweck im Recht (Purpose in Law), Kohler, the
behemoth of German legal philosophy, tells us that it is full of
~'amateurish platitudes". The whole idea of it was borrowed from
the English Utilitarians whose theories Jhering gave a German
dressing and perpetrated as original matter. The first volume is
translated and published by the associated law schools. He did
one good act, he thoroughly punished the aforesaid Puchta in the
gentle German way that uses a buldgeon, but never a rapier. What
Jhering professes to have discovered is that the law exists not for
single men, but for social ends (and a precious discovery it is, but
over two thousand years too late), and can be consciously formed
by legislation toward that end, as Bentham contended in his Principles of Morals and Legislation. Since the English Parliament from
1275, the beginning of Edward I's great reforming statutes, had
filled many volumes with acts of legislation all openly for the putpose of social ends, Jhering's great discovery seems to lack patent01

This tale may be found in the life of Gaius in Continental Jurlsts.
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able novelty, even if Plato, Aristotle and Cicero had not anticipated
him by prior use. But he begins with the usual metaphysical ap·
paratus, in which he evolves a psychology of the lower animals,
followed by a psychology of purpose in ma~, which bears not the
faintest relation to actual fact. He passes through egoism and
altruism, to the rewards of society, and the coercian of law. In
the course of his work, he descends to simple German prattle ;98
he shows that the military class in Germany perpetuates itself by
the factors, first, of the government furnishing free public institu·
tions for instruction "as well as facility for study by means of
stipends, free board, etc. The second factor is the rich wife. She
constitutes an important factor in the present system of the gov·,
ernment service, a scarcely less important requirement than the
passing· of the examinations. Care is taken that the procuring of
it shall not be too difficult. The daughter of the rich manufacturer
or merchant becomes the wife of the military officer or state official;
she brings him the money, he brings her social position, both are
benefited". This is what is called the application of Geist to the
lntelligenzstaat, and to a grave professor at GOttingen it is phil·
osophy of law. Somewhere Heine says that the three great enemies
of Napoleon were Louis XVIII, Lord Castlereagh and Professor
Saalfeld of the University of Gottingen. They all suffered a hor·
rible fate. Louis XVIII rotted upon his throne, Castlereagh cut
his own throat and Professor Saalfeld is still a professor at the
University of GOttingen. In 1848 the liberal minded professors
were all driven from GOttingen, hence Jhering. It is a pleasure
to leave this vulgar old man who deserved to die a professor at
GOttingen.
We have often referred to Berolzheimer's Legal Philosophies. In
the fields of ancient law the Germans are particularly strong. Any
sort of particular assertion almost can be made and no one can
contradict it, although the general facts are plain. Berolzheimer fol·
lows in his early pages the work of Leist, who without the least dif·
ficulty constructs a Primitive Aryan Jus Civile and a Primitive
Aryan lits Gentium. It seems hardly necessary to point out that
the jus civile and jits gentiitm were peculiar products of a special
social situation at Rome, that nothing of the kind could have existed
among the primitive Aryans, that an equitable system of law by
the side of a rigid formulary system is peculiarly the work of a
legal profession. Such difficulties are nothing to Leist; he evolves
es Law As A Means To An End, p.
im Rech:).
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(a poor title for the translation of Der Zweck
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for the primitive Aryans a jus civile and a jus gtntium, and thereby
sheds the light of German moonshine over Berolzheimer's p~ges.
In speaking of Roman law, Berolzheimer following Leist in his
Graeco-italische Rechtsgeschichte says that the jies gentimn, which
caused the renaissance of Roman law, was accomplished through
the philosophical principle of "Ratio (reason). It meant what the
Egyptians figured as 'Ra', natural energy deified, or the ancient
Aryans as 'Rita' the regulative principle of the world and nature".99
On the strength of this problematical common root this whole theory
is founded, a purely German process without any validity. By this
method of reasoning it is possible absolutely to prove that that wholly
unoffending person, Mr. Felix Frankfurter, is the lineal descendant
of a happy (f eli%) sausage. But Berolzheimer goes further ;1Q 0 he
says that the Greek sophrosmze comprised "all the virtues, moderation in all things-the aeqtta mens of Horace, including, as the prime
virtue, justice." This is where the German shows his cloven hoof.
He assumes that any sort of statement will pass.
Horace's aequa mens occurs in the passage:·
Aequam memento rebus in arduis
Servare mentem, non secus in bonis
Ab insolenti temperatam
Laetitia, moriture Delli.101
It means in Knapdale's translation,1° 2 which I give for its neatness
and which has none of Horace's curiosa felicitas:
"Keep a stout heart when times are bad, my boy,
And don't forget, when things are looking better,
To guard against extravagance in joy,
For death will come-a foe no man can fetter."
It is the old Epicurean thought and has no more to do with the
Platonic sophrosune than with German Kultur. Why Fritz should
assert this to an unsuspecting world passeth all human comprehension.103
.. Berolzheimer, p. 83.
100 Legal Philosophies, p. 61.
101 Horace Odes ii, 3, 1.
101 Blackwood's Mag. cxv, 300.
103 It was reserved for Bluntschli (Theory of the State, 15-23), to insult the whole
feminist movement. He asserts in all soberness that the state is philosophically and historically a number of men with a fixed territory, it has unity, an organic nature with
spirit\ ,and body, with various members, it develops and grows but not naturally; it
has a moral and spiritual organism and is a personality of the masculine gender/ Shade
of Susan B. Anthony, arise and lead us!
Give us an hour of Carrie Catt,
One lift of Anna's lance,
to convince this Teuto-Switzer that the state is not a male person.
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We come now to the leviathan Kohler and his Lehrbuch der
Rechtsphilosophie. I have already quoted the paeans of the
duumvirate of our legal philosophy, and we are prepared for a
work of transcendent merit.104 But first let me state with considerable awe that Professor Kocourek in his introduction to the
translation asserts that Kohler, this professor of law, "has all the
versatility and inspiration of Goethe, without any of his frailties".
These be mighty and Tamberlanian words, my Masters, and it behooves us to ponder them deeply. Goethe is, indeed, one of the
great lights of the world. If we look over the history of the race
we cannot find to rank with him as men of letters more than Plato,
Cicero, Voltaire and Shakespeare.
"When Goethe's death was told, we said,
Sunk, then, is Europe's sagest head.
He took the suffering human race,
He read each wound, each weakness clear;
And struck his finger on the place,
And said, Thou ailest here and here."
One of the saddest moral debacles in history is shown by the fact
that at any time within the last thirty years his voice must have
been silent in Germany. He was a true cosmopolite, who would
have valued at their actual worth Germany's designs to conquer
the world, her greed toward her neighbors. He would have rebuked the feverish activities by which she sought and in many ways
succeeded in extending her commerce by methods as ruthless as
those she has exhibited in this, on Germany's part, the most brutal
war in history. Goethe could not have foreborne his Olympian
reproof to the rapine, cruelties and frightful barbarities toward noncombatants, men, women and children, the indiscriminate stealing
of private and public property, the indescribable savageries toward
prisoners, the warfare of poisonous gases and of poisoning wells,
and the dissemination of poison cultures to supplement the no less
poisonous Kidtur. To Goethe with his wide outlook how dishonoring would have seemed the repulsiveness of the Germany of today
and its cult of covetousness, its succession of generations trained to
forget Goethe's, "Thou shalt go without, go without; this is the
eternal song that every hour hoarsely sings to us our whole life

'°'

In the two volumes of material on comparative law published by the Associated
Law Schools, compiled by Dean Wigmore and Professor Kocourek, will be found the
portions of the book that touch comparative law. This collection is quite interesting,
but many of the conclusions are not proven or capable of proof as our knowledge now
stands.

GERMAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

long''. 105 After her prolonged debauch of Pritssianisnms Germany
will be compelled to return to the wisdom of Goethe, but that time
seems so far away that Professor Kocourek will have ample opportunity to learn that one line of Goethe is worth a Congressional Library of Kohler.
Kohler has written a book of patent law that has been translated
and is highly spoken of, as are also his writings on the German
Civil Code, but the only book by him that is of importance for
us is his Philosophy of Law. Its favorite word is the constantly
recurring "culture", used with many diverse meanings. When applied to Germany it is merely our old conceited friend "Geist" draped
in a supposedly Hegelian toga. Applied to other countries it connotes some particular kind of civilization that the country has produced. But in his book Kohler nowhere defines the term for the
obvious reason that in the German way, for purposes of vagueness
and to cover looseness of thinking, he desires to vary the meaning
without warning. Simple and credulous persons are likely to be
deceived. Professor Kocourek quoting from Kohler thinks that
Kohler's only definition of K1tltur "in the sense of philosophy of
law is the greatest possible development of human knowledge and
of human control over nature".106 This is merely another word for
civilization and surely there is nothing more trite than that history
shows a developing civilization. But the element in culture of human knowledge includes the other element of control over nature,
unless Kohler means to say that actual culture which is an individual
mental condition is on no higher plane than the mere machinery of
life. The real difficulty, however, is to decide whether culture is
an individual self realization of one's highest attributes, or a mere
governmental training of the population. In some places Kohler
seems to use the word in the sense which he copied from Matthew
Arnold's Culture and Anarchy as the greatest individual perfection
of man. In other places, he uses it merely as synonymous with
evolution. He says elsewhere that every culture has at a particular
period its- postulates of law, and he is using the word to denote
merely a stage of development with its appropriate laws. In an·
other connection he speaks of the demands of culture upon law as
the required adaptation of law to social conditions. This hopeless
mixture is essentially Teutonic. It is due to the fact that every
1 os

Entbchren sol/st d11! sol/st entbefiren!
Das ist der ewige Gcsang,
Den unser gan::en Leben lang
Uns l1eiscr jede Stunde singt.
100 Kohler, Phil. of Law, 329, note 4.
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German professor makes his reputation by emitting some new
theory. Having enunciated a theory they invent facts or bend and
twist them to suit the theory without any apparent consciousness of
mental dishonesty.
German lawyers have not our training in the rules of evidence nor
our respect for facts. Their law professors are shut up by themselves, cut off from contact with practical life and affairs and seem
to lose all balance of judgment. Here is Kohler, who in his first
pages enters upon a savage attack upon natural law, found soon assaulting Jhering because the latter in his Purpose in Law hoped
to assist social conditions by legislation, which is just what Kohler
had been asserting as the demand of culture. In the next breath he
is abus!ng Windscheid because the latter rejected natural law and
asserted that the sense of justice is not a source of law, whereas
Kohler had been practically asserting the same thing. This is a
peculiarity of German professorial life. The savage attacks upon
each other can be found nowhere else in Europe, since Milton had
his famous controversy with Salmasius. In Biblical criticism they
are just as savage. "Hear Dr. Volkmar on Tischendorf: 'of every
sovereign in the world he has begged decorations; in vain ; people
would not treat him seriously. Renan in his life of Jesus never
once names the Messiah Tischendorf'. Hear Tischendorf on Dr.
Volkmar: 'The liedom which tramples under foot Church and science indifferently! stuck full of lying and cheating'. Professor
Steinthal says of a rival: "That horrible humbug, that scolding flirt,
that tricky attorney! whenever I read him, hollow vanity yawns
in my face, arrogant vanity yawns at me'."
So it is in the philosophy of the law. Professor Beinkopf1° 7
finds something that strikes him as an idea in English or French or
Italian writing. He at once invents a new theory, sounds a new
watchword and savagely criticizes his rivals as without discernment. Thereupon Doctor Schlechtbier retorts with a rolling thunder
of German amenities pronouncing Beinkopf a hollow sham. This
rouses Professor Raucher who writes a grund-something-or-other to
prove to a demonstration that both Beinkopf and Schlechtbier are
mere dabblers in science, arrogant peacocks, and a disgrace to a
learned country. The noise of conflict arouses the Geheimrat
Rauhbart, and by a mere multiplying of language, beginning with
the heavy patter of metaphysics degenerating into a slow, steady,
endless drizzle of words, he drowns the others and demonstrates that
101 I am not sure that I have the name correctly, but it means just what he writes,
whatever it may be.
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Beinkopf, Schechtbier and Raucher are all of tnem totally wrong.
But after the storm has passed it is found that they were all asserting the same thoughts in different words, and the only residual
matter is their denunciations of one another. Professor Kocourek
apologizes for this "elemental savagery" of German "criticism" by
the fact that "the German language is blunt and plain".108 It seems
to be an extraordinary sort of language in which a man cannot express himself without being a blackguard. As a matter of fact the
German language is like their critical thought and writing. What
is needed is justness of perception in dealing with involved facts.
But in this sort of perception the German mind, as a great critic
has remarked, is naturally wanting. Their mind is like their language, not clear but vague and gauche; it has in it "something splay
and something blunt-edged, unhandy, infelicitous-some positive
want of straightforward, sure perception". The language permits
and encourages the invention of awkward, vague compounds, with
no restraint upon their ugliness. This gives their language to ordinary eyes its tremendously learned appearance. The average man
is bound to assume when he sees such agglutinative monstrosities as
Milita.rstrafgerichtsverfahren, Gerichtsverfassungsgestez, Poliszusammengeh6rigkeit, Geschlechtsgenossenschaft, Biiffelshalsbuckelsfettigheit, 109 Entwickelungsgeschichte, or V6lkerrechtswissenschaftslehre sprawling their uncouth lengths of tremendous consonantal
thickets across the page, that the language is learned and the
thought profound. But this is all illusion. Aristophanes or Plautus
did this kind of thing for fun, but the Germans are in deadly, sober
earnest.
Kohler as a preliminary matter lays down the metaphysical basis
or lack of basis of his legal philosophy, and at once we find ourselves in the Dismal Swamp of "reality", "ego", "non-ego", "duality"
and "identity". He rejects K'ant's dualism and Kant's demonstration after Hume that thinking subject, mind, cannot be identified
with the object thought of. This to Kohler is a great error but if
it had ever happened to Kohler to be hit in the head by a brick he
would find some difficulty in identifying the brick with his own
sensations. Nay, rather, Kohler says with owl-like gravity, "we
must assert that ego and non-ego belong to one great world whole".
Certainly we must, and it never occurred to Kant to claim that the
1os Kohler, Phil. of Law, p. xxi.
100 This word is the title of an obscure treatise on the fatty hump that some of the
gentler sex develop between the shoulders at the base of the neck as the years pass.
This German has invented in his gallant German way a word which translated means
Buffalo·neck-hump·fattishness and written a treatise on it.
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external world was out of the world. Kohler next enunciates his
· refutation of Kant's dualism: "If the ego apprehends the non-ego,
that is the external world about it, as an object, then the external
world becomes unified by perception with ou.r own ego and thereby
forms an entity independent but homogeneous to our own ego".
But Kohler simply thinks that he is thinking. To unite two things
so that they form independent entities is not identity but it is dualism and the infinite vagueness of his word "homogeneous" is apparent. The external world was a separate entity before it was
unified just as afterward. Kohler has now gotten out of his depth,
so he begins to quote Hegel : "I distinguish myself from myself
and therein I am immediately aware that this factor distinguished
from ll}e is not distinguished". By this he means: I can observe
the operations of my own mind, therefore I know that I am myself.
But this is the old Cartesian: "I think, therefore I exist", (je pense
done je suis). Then follows this gem: "I, the self same being,
thrust myself away from myself, but this which is distinguished,
which is set up as unlike me, is immediately upon its being distinguished no distinction for me." But what an absurdity it is.
Because I can observe my own mind, or to put it as we usually do,
because I am self-conscious, I know that what I am knowing is
my own mind, myself, and because I can observe my mind, it is a
part of the external world, but I identify my observed mind with
itself doing the observing, wherefore the external world is identified
with my own mind and is my mind.11° Kohler then on this basis
invents the most absurd of all the theories, a theory which shows
that he does not understand Hegel and is more dualistic even than
Kant. He says we have two minds, the mind that observes itself
and the other mind that is observed, a real ego and a phenomenon
ego. And now a man who is no metaphysician at all knows that
Kohler has talked himself into a German mess. But we must leave
Kohler in this Slough of metaphysical Despond.111 We merely remark that he does not connect his metaphysics with his philosophy
of law.
He now proceeds to reprimand. Ahrens, Krause and Roder "for
their utter banality and poverty of ideas", and Merkel who "caused
the decay of juristic thought" and Jhering who "with superficial
uo Leibnitz's apothegm is: "Nihil in intel/ectu nisi fotellectus ipse.''
111 There is a book, "Immanuel Kant," in two large windy volumes, by that pitiable
renegade Houston Stewart Chamberlain. I cannot advise any one who values his time
to read it, but in it the renegade has shown the Germans that in fuliginous vagueness
he has surpassed them all. In a sane moment he describes the Hegelian identity of!
subject and object as the "primeval Aryan Myth of all the Myths". See vol. i, 318, 319.
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brilliancy" made "a few stammering remarks", which is too delightful applied to a man who had all the volubility of a com
sheller. He next denounces Stammler for saying that "at no stage
of human culture has slavery been just", which certainly is true.
Even Cicero asserted it, and Seneca made a homily upon it, that
ought to convince even Kohler. Lastly Kohler mentions his colleague Lassan in a handsome way, and Lassan replies with a laudatory review at which the amiable Professor Kocourek is so astonished that he prints it as Appendix II to the book before another
review by a highly mystified Italian.
We need not delay over Kohler's commonplace views on causation and psychic life, by which he means mental factors of race
and individual psychology, or his excursion into collectivity and individualization without betraying any knowledge of evolutionary
psychology, or his remarks on the culture of wealth, where he makes
the total error of saying that the desire to accumulate property is
not innate, or his wholly inadequate explanation of possession or his
"technic of the law" which requires objects of right, by which he
means rights in material and immaterial things and rights in one's
own personality and in others' persons (the right in another does
not extend to destroying that other's personality) which rights are
either general or limited. Here he makes a classification that is
rendered possible only by the confusion in German legal conceptions. The counterpart of a right is a claim to call upon another
to perform some act. But he does not seem to know the difficulty
involved here, and his statement is so confused that it is apparent
that he has taken refuge in Hegelianism. He denies with heat that
individuals have a1iy cfaini upon the state for justice or that he is
"an exponent of the absolute State".
The whole subject of existing law he divides into the law of
individual persons, the law of the body politic and the law of
human society. The law of individual persons is divided into the
subdivisions of persons and of property. It is needless to say that
there is nothing new in his classification and the difficulties of the
classification are enormous. But it is all a mere sketchy outline with
some comparative law material that is not proven to say the least
of it. He enters upon a warm defence of the cultural value of
slavery, without betraying the slightest knowledge that slavery is
caused by an inadequate division of labor and is in that respect a
real obstacle to progress, while it feeds the cruel instincts of cruel
men. Yet in the next breath he avers that the substitution of a
peasant class and an artisan class ennobled work. What he does
not see is that the theory of the ancient world was. the production
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of a very highly developed but small class resting upon a very large
but degraded class, and that this conception violates the fundamental
notion of justice and therefore of law which he says must be ·
founded on justice. · Kohler has never di~covered what are the
moral emotions and their concepts and how they developed, and in
this regard he is like most German legal philosophers.
We need not delay upon his law of property and obligations. It
is all obvious enough but better stated by any of the English
analytical jurists, and much more clearly even by Gareis.112 His
division of public law begins with the statement that the State is a
community organized into a personality, which, by virtue of its own
law, takes upon itself the task of promoting culture and opposing
non-cul!ure; and "it aims at performing this task not only in certain
respects, but in all the directions of human endeavor and development." If this is so it must administer justice to its citizens and to
others against its citizens and between itself and individuals, but
this now conceded fact he had just before denied and had strenuously argued that it was neither proper nor necessary. He seems to
deny here the Prussian theory of the state and he does not meet
the question as to what is the state, whether the government or the
social aggregate, and he does not attempt to solve whether the state
is bound by its own laws. In his comparative law regarding the
evolution of the State he enters upon a warm eulogy of the Kingship and thoroughly endorses the necessity for the division of power
into legislative, executive and judicial. Kohler shows that he has
read much English history and literature, and therefore he is a
warm exponent of representative government. I pass over his
pages on the law of procedure merely remarking that the practical
difficulties do not seem to have occurred to him. He repudiates the
criminologists in the strongest and most cutting terms, and offers
some remarks of his own upon punishment which contain nothing
that is valuable or new.
We now reach the crucial point with Kohler, his law of humanity.
This term has a strange sound coming from a German, but before
the war Kohler was the German exponent of public international
law. He insists that in the ancient world public international law
was known and stood above the nations.113 The one universal Empire destroyed the necessity for such law, but when the imperial
=

Gareis, Science of Law (translated by Kocourek).
ua Philipson's International Law among the Greeks and Romans is an excellent work.
Kohler no doubt had read it, but like most Germans he is chary of giving foreign credit.
They rely upon foreign writings for the views which they announce as new to the befuddled Germans.
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sway was ended international law had to begin anew. "Hence the
idea was bound to arise that * * * a super-national law ruled, that
regulated the relations of the nations to one another; they, neither
(sic) could live in anarchy but (sic) must conduct themselves towards one another according to definite legal principles." Here he
admits the basis of and the necessity for, and the existence of international, or as he calls it, super-national law. He illustrates the
point by the law of federated states and he asserts that the two
are strictly analogous. "After the separation of states, international law, as the super-national standard, necessarily combined the
nations and created legal relations among them." "When once the
idea has arisen in this way that there is some law above the State,
a so-called super-national law, we have gained a new plane of culture". He advocates the proposition that super-national law grants
rights to individuals which are independent of the legislation of individual states. He then formulates certain rules of war, that war
is subject to international law, that war must be humane, that only
those sufferings may be inflicted which serve its purposes, that there
must be no war against the population, but only against the State and
its combatants. Only such war is legal, he asserts, and outside of
this range, combatants inflicting wrong are not protected by the
fact of war. Prisoners of war may not be harmed, inhabitants may
not be enslaved or robbed and plundered.
This is the result of Kohler's book. His principles pronounce
the submarine warfare on merchant vessels, the pillaging of Belgium, northern France and Serbia, the robbery and plundering of
the inhabitants, the cruelties toward the prisoners in German hands,
to be absolutely unlawful, and the men who have ordered it are,
according to him, personally responsible under international law. He
condemns, also, the poison gases used by the Germans, the bombarding of unprotected and unfortified cities with or without notice.
The shelling of merchant vessels with or without warning, the
dastardly acts by which boats putting off are shelled and sunk, are
acts of piracy according to Kohler. If what he wrote before the
war is true, the Kaiser and his general and naval staff, and most
of his commanders in the field, may be punished as criminals under
the rules of international law since they have departed from the
laws of war and cannot plead its protection. According to Kohler's
ideas international law justifies the hanging of the Kaiser when he
is apprehended. It is proven by this book written before the war
by the highest authority in Germany that the contentions of the
Allies are strictly true.
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Now I have to record the strangest Teutonic phenomenon in the
philosophy of law. Here was a man committed to the rules of international law and to their binding effect. He had been braying
about culture for many years. He had edited the Zeitschrift fiir
Volkerrecht (Journal of International Law). He had asserted by
anticipation that the whole method of German warfare was illegal
and barbarous. But when the war had started he showed his own
lack of mental honesty in an article in his Journal which is a genuine
curiosity.114 He there first speaks of the efforts of The Hague
Peace Conferences and says that those dreams have bur!?t like bubbles. He means that the Germans having solemnly engaged to observe the rules, treated them like bubbles even unto bursting.
"We. also were enthralled by these illusions and we are frank
enough to confess, if we are rebuked for being impractical and
shortsighted for doing so, that it was our honorable German nature
which permitted us to overlook cunning and wickedness ; it was
our belief in mankind which led us and the thought that at least a
spark of our German idealism was to be found among other peoples". One would imagine that he means to say that his "honorable" German nature was deceived by the Kaiser, but no, we find
that this greatest living jurist is not an actual man, merely a thing
painted to look like a man. He deliberately says that what he means
is that he did not know what the German general staff was going
to do, and hence he was grossly deceived in the honesty of the
Allies, because they objected and left him bound by the rules that
he had been asserting as rules of international law. By his method
of reasoning Belgium was guilty of a gross breach of faith to him
personally when it objected to being pillaged.
But Kohler goes on with an elaborately tiresome figure from the
Wagnerian music of the speech of the birds in the forest, and here
he makes a grotesque error in metaphor. The speech of the birds
that Siegfried heard was the speech of innocent, well meaning
birds, yet Kohler has his hulking Siegfried hearing in the speech
of the innocent birds lies and slander, and suddenly in this mixed
metaphor the birds have become a dragon of cunning, lies and
slander which is "stretched beneath our victorious sword". Now
comes the German blackguardism so prominent a characteristic of
their legal philosophers. He seems to think that the Allies had
no right to insist on the treaties because they are "liars and falsifiers" ; the French are "a nation of bragging tricksters", the English
n• See the article in Michigan Law Rev. xv, 634, translated by Professor Reeves, now
of the Flying Corps.
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are "a race of sneaking bandits" who resorted to bribery to apprehend that patriot Roger Casement, the Russians are "a nation
of barbarians" (perhaps now he would find good in Lenine and his
tribe), the Italians are "an immature and half educated proletariat",
the United States is "ruled by the Morgan-Vanderbilt" millions,
and all are cast into outer darkness. Could anything be more utterly
fantastic, and is not Kohler a pronouncedly stuffed prophet?
But he goes on to console himself with the thought that in the
future Germany will have no international law with any nations except those within "our circle of culture", Austria, "the highly gifted
Hungarians" and "an important group of Slavs", "in alliance with
Turkey as a powerful fortress of Islamic culture". Fortunately we
have some very apposite remarks on Turkey as the depositary of
culture by Germany's most popular historian. Treitschke says of
Turkey: "It is to be hoped that the future will wipe out the scandal
of having such a government on European soil. * * * The Turks
have never developed at all, and in virture of their lazy-mindedness
have always remained a nation of soldiers. * * * A state capable
of such proceedings will never change, but since some of the old
martial spirit survives * * * Turkey will in all probability remain
in Europe until driven out by force. * * * 'The famous dogs of
Constantinople are the best simile that can be found of a people
mentally inert. ':' * * It was therefore quite reasonable and logical
to exclude the Porte, for many hundreds of years, from the scope
of European international law. The government of the Sultan had
no claim to a full share in its benefits so long as the Porte was
dominated by a Mohammedan civilization".115 Treitschke little supposed that the day would come when Germany would stand before
the world as a criminal condemned to be excluded from the equality
of international law until she had rid herself of a government of
freebooters worse than the Sultan. Kohler concludes his article:
"Naturally International Law needs its sanction just as every
branch of law does, but we shall, as I hope, be so vastly fortified
by our victorious war that we can undertake the protection of International Law". But he has already said that international law
is to be confined to Germany and her subject nations, Austria,
Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey.
Thus we see that for Germany international law means the kind
of law that enables Germany to do what she pleases, to violate
treaties, to perpetrate all manner of barbarities, and this international
law she is prepared to protect. It is the solid, aes triplex plate of
m See Treitschke's Politics, vot ii, passim.
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conceit and arrogance that prevents these Germans from appraising
themselves correctly. For many years it has been so beaten into
them that they are the greatest race, entitled by divine right to
rule the world, that they think they are actil}g too modestly if they
are not continually insisting upon it. The greatest critic of life
that England has yet produced has said in his inimitable way: "Dr.
Mommsen, when he became Rector of the University of Berlin, with
a charming crudity, gravely congratulated his countrymen on not
being modest, and adjured them never to fall into that sad fault.
These are the intemperances and extravagances which men versed
in practical life feel to be absurd. One is not disposed to form
great expectations of the balance of judgment in those who commit the_m". In matters requiring as much tact in weighing facts
and judgment in sifting theories as is required in the philosophy
of law, we may be sure that the Germans are conspicuously wanting, and therefore of no use to us. We have seen that Kohler in
his book is wanting in judgment and coherence, and in his conduct
has displayed a childishness that is hopeless. All we can say of a
man who thinks him the greatest jurist in the world is,

B oetum ·in crasso jurares aere natuni.
But here let me record that there is in Germany a basis to build
upon anew. Dr. Wehberg, of Diisseldorf, took issue with Kohler,
sharply reproved him and discontinued his association with the
Zeitschrift. But among the great mass of them Kohler will remain
a prophet and a great jurist even as he is to Dean Pound and Professor Kocourek. But it needs only a critical examination to show
that the abnormal self-conceit, the lack of humor of self-conceit,
the blindness and incapacity for self-examination that come from
self-conceit, make German philosophy of law utterly worthless. The
late Dean Ames of the Harvard Law School, a finished scholar who
worked with distinction on the lines that offer so much to the legal
scholar, a man whose death was an irreparable loss, told a student
of his who was departing for Germany to avoid their philosophy of
law. He had found it to be mere pedantry and chaff-cutting. The
situation is really worse. The difference between a civilized man
and a barbarian or savage is that the latter cannot appreciate another's point of view. In this respect the German is a barbarian, for
he will not even examine another's point of view, hence his greed
for what he calls "his place in the sun", which means the taking of
another's place.
The very history of our race and the necessities of social existence teach us that among nations the same justice shall apply as
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among individuals. The primary notions of fn:eaom and equality
are precisely as binding. All must be equal before that International Law which is the ligament of justice that holds the nations together. The humble state has a claim on international law as great
and as sacred as that of any other state. In one view its rights
are even greater, for it is base and unmanly to trample on the
weak. The invasion of a strong country may require courage, but
to tread upon the weak adds contemptible and cowardly meanness
to a cruel wrong. The world cannot admit the pretension of a lot
of criminals under international law to repeal the law of justice
and equality that is made for all nations. The civilized world has
been taken at a disadvantage by the strong marauder who had prepared his forces, but the posse nationuni has been organized, is being
constantly augmented.
If the safety of a single state from robbery and oppression is
worth fighting for, how much more vital is it to preserve the moral
government of all civilized society. To this end the criminals must
be apprehended that the law may be restored for the law-abiding.
"They pour their youth and treasure
For the fullness of the measure
Of the light that shall endure, of the law that shall be sure,
Of the equity of freedom-that all nations may possess".116
:no Lines from "America to England, 1917,'' by Charles Mills Gayley.

